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## HAITI INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM

# Improving Self-Reliance in the Architecture & Engineering Sector in Haiti

July 2019

Contract Number: AID-OAA-I-15-000045

Order No: 72052118F00004

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**Submitted to:**

USAID Haiti

**Prepared by:**

AECOM

**Disclaimer:**

The views expressed in this document do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or the United States Government.

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## List of Acronyms

A&E	Architect and engineering
CLA	Collaboration, learning, and adaptation
DFID	The Department for International Development
FENAMH	La Federation nationale des maires d'Haiti
FGD	Focus group discussion
GHSC-PSM	USAID Global Health Supply Chain Program-Procurement and Supply Management
HHIP	Haiti Health Infrastructure Program
HR	Human Resources
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPs	Implementing partners
KII	Key informant interview
MTPTC	Ministère des Travaux Publics, Transports et Communications.
OD	Organizational Development
UCLBP	Unité de Construction de Logements et de Bâtiments Publics
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UTE	Technical Execution Unit
WI-HER	Women Influencing Health, Education, and the Rule of Law
WOCCU	World Council of Credit Unions

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Under the direction of Administrator Mark Green, USAID has updated its policies, practices, and strategies to more tactically support countries on their “Journey to Self-Reliance.” To support USAID in achieving the goals of self-reliance, autonomy, resiliency, and sustainability, WI-HER and the Haiti Infrastructure Program, led by AECOM, conducted an infrastructure sector assessment to identify common weaknesses or gaps in local capacity, systems, commitment to reform, policies, training, and the supportive environment related to Haiti’s advancement on that journey, specifically for the infrastructure sector in Haiti. Importantly, the framework used for this assessment connects to the larger vision for the Journey to Self-Reliance while focusing specifically on organizational development.

WI-HER performed a thorough infrastructure assessment, inclusive of three weeks of field work in Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien. In these communities, WI-HER collected surveys and conducted focus group discussions and key informant interviews with USAID, the Government of Haiti, implementing partners, architecture and engineering students, local organizations and general contractors in the infrastructure sector (architecture, engineering, and construction). The assessment collected both quantitative and qualitative data to explore five major areas defined above: a supportive external environment, culture and commitment to reform, technical capacity, organizational capacity, and sector performance. Using USAID performance indicators and evidenced-based organizational performance indicators from Six Sigma, Kaizen, and others, WI-HER rated how well organizations within the sector were performing, looking at their technical capacity, organizational capacity, including management and operational, and their ability to make profit. We assessed the political and economic environment around the sector, looking at commitment and capacity indicators related to the Journey to Self-Reliance.

WI-HER assembled and evaluated the data and distilled patterns into meaningful findings. Quantitative findings reveal strengths, opportunities, and significant challenges across the infrastructure sector, including organizational capacity public sector commitment and governance, and work environment, which facilitate or obstruct productivity and growth. All participants agreed that the external environment proposes the greatest challenge to the infrastructure sector in Haiti. Qualitative interviews and focus group discussions also revealed deeper challenges as well as strengths in the sector and opportunities for further investment.

Based on assessment findings, WI-HER puts forth a number of recommendations that we believe will capitalize on opportunities, build on successes, fill gaps, and address challenges. These recommendations are inclusive of policies and programs that will strengthen the external environment to support improved infrastructure sector outcomes, capacity building of local contractors and firms, and initiatives or activities that will contribute to sustainable development and ultimately greater self-reliance. The recommendations summarized in the table below highlight overarching investments that will build the foundation for longer term success and improved self-reliance in the infrastructure sector in Haiti. These recommendations will advance not only the infrastructure sector but will set a course for sustainability and resilience that will benefit other sectors as well. The recommendations also specify shorter term actions to sustain momentum and achieve quick wins.

The foundational investments for longer term success—listed below—include investments for improved government capacity and sector competence, which will move the infrastructure sector in Haiti towards being more sustainable, resilient, and self-reliant.

1. **Quality and Oversight.** WI-HER recommends that USAID and partners continue to build the capacity of the government in quality assurance and oversight to ensure that policies are adhered to and enforced; that infrastructure is built according to code; that land titles are defined, documented, and respected; and that both government and donor investments are used efficiently.
2. **Eliminate Corruption.** USAID/Haiti has a unique opportunity to improve the capacity of the Government of Haiti and eliminate corruption. USAID has an office of democracy, human rights, and governance with which the USAID advisors and Haiti infrastructure sector stakeholders could collaborate. Building the government's capacity in this regard will ultimately lead to greater self-reliance, sustainability, and resilience.
3. **Land-titling.** Part of quality assurance is ensuring that land titles are respected. Improving land titling is important for business investment and economic growth, promoting stability and reducing conflict, and improving resilience to natural disasters. USAID has experience globally supporting and building local capacity to lead and manage legal, policy, and institutional reforms for land titling. WI-HER recommends that USAID/Haiti leverage this expertise for the Haitian context.
4. **Education.** USAID should explore options for improving the quality of architecture and engineering schools across the country. WI-HER recommends that USAID work with the Government of Haiti to standardize curricula and build a robust and effective accreditation program. This will ensure that all students who are interested in becoming an architect or engineer can access a quality education and that they are prepared to enter the workforce upon their graduation. Ultimately, with improvements in the quality of education, local contractors and organizations will become increasingly capable of managing large and complex infrastructure programs, thus leading their own development.

#### Summary of findings and corresponding recommendations:

Measurement Areas	Findings: Challenges or Needs	Recommendations: overarching and shorter-term investments
Supportive External Environment	<p>Government instability</p> <p>Lack of institutional norms</p> <p>Corruption</p> <p>Unclear/weak policies</p> <p>Unclear land titles</p> <p>Ineffective labor laws</p>	<p>Build capacity of government in quality assurance and oversight</p> <p>Build government capacity to eliminate corruption</p> <p>Improve land titling system</p> <p>Work with the government to improve oversight and reduce fraud</p> <p>Work with the government on visioning and strategic planning</p>
Culture and Commitment to Reform	<p>No support systems for local infrastructure companies and contractors (no associations or opportunities for training)</p>	<p>Reinforce/build the capacity of the professional associations.</p> <p>USAID facilitate coordination.</p>

Measurement Areas	Findings: Challenges or Needs	Recommendations: overarching and shorter-term investments
	<p>Lack of coordination between organizations</p> <p>Insufficient engagement of construction community with beneficiary community</p>	
Technical Capacity	<p>Limited understanding of codes and guidelines by local infrastructure organizations / contractors</p> <p>Insufficient practical training</p> <p>No standardized accreditation and licensure</p> <p>Language barriers between local infrastructure firms and contractors and USAID representatives and implementing partners</p>	<p>Accredit schools and standardize quality measures and curricula.</p> <p>Reinforce/build the capacity of the professional associations.</p> <p>Sub-contracting to local organizations; focus on capacity building.</p> <p>Create opportunities for internships.</p>
Operational Capacity	<p>Local infrastructure firms' lack of training in business</p> <p>Insufficient systems and capacity to bid on and manage projects</p> <p>Difficulty securing finances</p> <p>Nepotism in HR practices</p>	<p>Reinforce/build the capacity of the professional associations.</p> <p>Sub-contracting to local organizations; focus on capacity building.</p> <p>Training in organizational management and bidding.</p> <p>Create opportunities for internships.</p>
Sector Performance	<p>Unrealistic bids (under-budgeted in terms of time and funding) affecting quality</p>	<p>Thoroughly evaluate organizations during bidding, ensure bids are realistic</p>



## CONTEXT AND PROJECT DESCRIPTION

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### Background and Haitian Context

With a GDP per capita of \$765, Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere.<sup>i</sup> It is also one of the largest countries in the Caribbean with a population of 11 million.<sup>ii</sup> Over 6 million Haitians live below the national poverty line (US\$2.41 per day), and more than 2.5 million are living in extreme poverty (below US\$1.23 per day).<sup>iii</sup> Haiti also has low levels of human development, ranking 168 out of 189 countries,<sup>iv</sup> and unemployment is currently around 14 percent.<sup>v</sup>

Haiti is highly vulnerable to natural disasters including hurricanes and earthquakes. More than 93% of the country is exposed to these natural disasters, which has important implications for the infrastructure sector and highlights the need to engage qualified engineers in the construction of homes and public infrastructure. Recovery efforts are ongoing after Hurricane Matthew hit the country in 2016, which caused a loss valued at 32% of the 2015 GDP.<sup>vi</sup> Matthew came just 6 years after the more devastating 7.0 magnitude earthquake, which killed an estimated 230,000 people and displaced more than 1.5 million people due to collapsed buildings and infrastructure. Damages and losses from the earthquake totaled 120% of Haiti's GDP, and reconstruction needs amounted to over \$11 billion.<sup>vii</sup> According to the World Bank, "the unprecedented damage throughout the country weakened the government's ability to respond to the crisis."<sup>viii</sup> Not only were a third of civil servants lost due to the earthquake, but key administrative buildings, including the National Palace, the National Penitentiary, the Parliament, and multiple ministries were ruined. Service delivery infrastructure, including the primary road network to Port-au-Prince, was also destroyed.<sup>ix</sup>

Throughout the past decade of rebuilding the country, macroeconomic instability, conflict and violence in Port-au-Prince, and government turnover are all impacting the Government of Haiti and development partners' ability to implement policies and programs. The national currency (the gourde) continues to depreciate, fueling around 18% inflation, hurting local businesses, and further marginalizing the poorest households.<sup>x</sup> Recently, Haiti has experienced several periods of instability caused by demonstrations, strikes, and civil unrest.<sup>xi</sup> Furthermore, in March 2019, a vote of no-confidence was passed against Prime Minister Jean Henry Ceant, just six months after he assumed office. According to USAID, "powerful and entrenched economic and political forces create a system marked by widespread corruption, as well as a lack of transparency and accountability, rule of law, and service provision for Haitian citizens. Other serious constraints to development include continuing exchange rate volatility, stagnant economic growth, high unemployment, lack of economic opportunity, burgeoning population growth (from 7.1 to 10.7 million between 1990 and 2015)."<sup>xii</sup>

Due to major reconstruction needs, the Haitian infrastructure sector is one of the largest employment sectors in Haiti and it has been an area of significant donor investment. Industry, which includes construction (as well as mining, electricity, water, and gas) constitutes 50 percent of Haiti's annual GDP.<sup>xiii</sup> There are approximately 300 firms and building contractors in Port-au-Prince alone.<sup>xiv</sup> However, in part due to the fiscal volatility and macroeconomic stagnation, security issues, and political instability, challenges persist in this sector, limiting the government's capacity to invest in the Haitian people and the country's growth. These factors also limit local companies' ability to sustain their businesses without interruption, make profits, construct reliable financing mechanisms, retain talented workers, and recruit foreign private investment.

A recent article in the Haitian newspaper, Le Nouvelliste, summarized some of these economic impacts on the construction sector. The article explains:

*“Times are tough for many Haitian companies operating in the construction sector of buildings and public works. Indebted, circumvented, faced with a difficult economic situation and forced to dismiss massively, they fear the filing of a balance sheet. Tens of thousands of jobs created in the sector by construction companies no longer exist. The state, which has chosen to carry out a lot of its work in management, has accumulated significant debts for private companies on previous projects. To survive, local companies are outsourcing or working in partnership with foreign firms. If you are not outsourcing or in association with a foreign firm, the Haitian firm does not work. The last three or four tenders for high schools have all been eliminated. The state takes years to pay contracts in gourdes while buying inputs in US dollars. Companies are solely responsible for foreign exchange risks. The payment in gourdes of a contract after years is detrimental. [Foreign contractors] are reluctant to continue their projects. The sharp rise in materials in anticipation of the dollar's rise slows down further work.”<sup>xv</sup>*

While the infrastructure sector has been impacted by economic challenges, improving the sector would contribute to sustainable economic growth. Other challenges—as well as successes and opportunities—that were revealed through the assessment are presented in greater detail in the **Findings** section below.

Two months after the earthquake, the international community pledged more than \$9 billion to support Haiti’s recovery from the earthquake. To help with this pledge, the United States Congress passed the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010,<sup>xvi</sup> which provided more than \$1 billion in reconstruction funds for Haiti.<sup>xvii</sup> From 2011-2018, USAID/Haiti had been operating under the Post Earthquake U.S. Government Strategy. However, given the shifting landscape in Haiti, USAID developed a new Strategic Framework 2018-2020 with specific development objectives and program priorities. Relevant to this assessment, the Strategic Framework recognizes the need to integrate resilience across multiple sectors, to improve currently weak governance and rule of law, and to improve infrastructure for the well-being of Haitian citizens.<sup>xviii</sup> It is in this context that the Haiti Infrastructure Program is operating-improving infrastructure and, with the findings from this assessment, contributing to improvements in resiliency, autonomy, and self-reliance.

Under the direction of Administrator Green, USAID has updated its policies, practices, and strategies to more tactically support countries on their “Journey to Self-Reliance”. USAID has defined this as “a country’s ability to plan, finance, and implement solutions to address its own development challenges,” measured by its commitment and capacity.<sup>xix</sup> A recent USAID assessment showed that Haiti is currently one of the poorest performers on the “Journey to Self-Reliance”, scoring far below the low and middle income country average for on almost every metric of government capacity and commitment. On a zero to one scale, Haiti falls below 0.5, signaling room for advancement in both commitment and capacity. Haiti’s country snapshot is included in **Appendix A**.

Improving quality infrastructure is in line with goals of self-reliance and sustainability as quality infrastructure yields long-term economic and growth dividends. Conversely, deficiencies in the quality of infrastructure are a significant bottleneck to sustainable development. With support from donors, such as USAID, Government investments in sustainable quality infrastructure can be supplemented with improved planning and management practices that look at long-term economic efficiency.

## Haiti Infrastructure Program

Since the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 and Hurricane Matthew in 2016, there have been numerous construction programs to improve Haitian public and private infrastructure, including health infrastructure, roads and other public works, permanent housing, ports, and water and sanitation infrastructure.<sup>xx,xxi</sup> AECOM has been at the forefront of many of these endeavors, working with USAID and the Haitian government to rebuild, first under the Haiti Health Infrastructure Program (HHIP) in 2016, and now again under the Haiti Infrastructure Program (HIP). HIP is an incrementally funded program, with a \$22.82M ceiling, that provides quality assurance technical services to assist USAID in designing and managing the multisectoral infrastructure portfolio in Haiti.

WI-HER, LLC (Women Influencing Health, Education and Rule of Law) is a woman-owned small business and international consulting firm based in the Washington D.C. area. WI-HER partners with international donors and national governments to identify and implement creative solutions to complex development challenges to achieve better, healthier lives for women, men, girls, and boys. Established in 2008, the company has extensive experience in capacity building; organizational development; monitoring, evaluation, research, and learning; collaboration, learning, and adapting (CLA); knowledge management; and gender integration across multiple sectors. WI-HER applies an innovative, science-based and systematic approach, using adaptive learning techniques, to address disparities while strengthening communities to recognize and respond to development gaps. WI-HER's role on HIP is to provide technical assistance that will help AECOM and USAID best support the stability and prosperity of the infrastructure sector and facilitate advancement on the Journey to Self-Reliance. Specifically, WI-HER's role is to explore gaps and opportunities in improving education, strengthening the capacity of the local companies and firms within the infrastructure community, supporting reforms and oversight mechanisms in the government, and targeting USAID's investments toward the highest impact interventions.

## ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVES

To support USAID in achieving its “Journey to Self-Reliance” goals, WI-HER developed an innovative methodology for measuring self-reliance, autonomy, resiliency, and sustainability in the context of the infrastructure sector. Together, WI-HER and AECOM conducted this assessment to identify common weaknesses or gaps in local capacity and commitment that are hindering this journey to self-reliance, specifically related to the infrastructure sector in Haiti. The assessment identified factors constricting progress and contributing to success. The assessment aimed to answer the following primary research questions:

What are the gaps and challenges that are hindering architecture, engineering, and construction organizations and the government’s ability to achieve self-reliance?

What are the enabling and constricting factors in implementing high quality, efficient, and sustainable infrastructure projects?

What are evidence-based interventions or approaches in which USAID might invest or implement to address these challenges and lay a clear path towards a strengthened infrastructure community and self-reliant government and local organizations?

What intervention measurement techniques will demonstrate tangible improvements in capacity and value for investment?

The assessment team evaluated the answers to these questions around five major measurement areas: 1) a supportive external environment, 2) culture and commitment to reform, 3) technical capacity, 4) organizational capacity, and 5) sector performance. Under each measurement area, there are one to four indicators (see **Figure 1**).

**FIGURE 1: ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK MEASUREMENT AREAS AND INDICATORS**




This framework is rooted in research and directly ties to USAID’s metrics for the journey to self-reliance (See matrix in **Appendix B**). USAID’s “Journey to Self-Reliance” tracks a “a country’s ability to plan, finance, and implement solutions to address its own development challenges.” This approach to development prioritizes fostering stable, resilient, prosperous, and self-reliant countries.” According to USAID, there are two “mutually-reinforcing factors [that] determine a country’s self-reliance”: commitment and capacity. The commitment metric measures “the degree to which a country’s laws, policies, actions, and informal governance mechanisms - such as cultures and norms - support progress towards self-reliance.” The capacity metric measures “how far a country has come in its ability to manage its own development journey across the dimensions of political, social, and economic development, including the ability to work across these sectors.”<sup>xxii</sup> Our measure of commitment is captured under the category of “culture and commitment to reform.” Our measure of capacity is captured under categories “technical capacity,” “organizational capacity,” “sector performance,” and “supportive external environment.” Therefore, our measure of capacity captures both the capacity of the external environment to support development in the sector, and the individual local entities’ capacity for management, operations, and profit-making.

**FIGURE 2: OUR FRAMEWORK AND THE ROAD TO SELF-RELIANCE**

The WI-HER framework’s five measurement areas represent turning points to continue on the road or journey to self-reliance. **Figure 2** illustrates those turning points, showing that with improvements in each of the five categories of the framework, organizations and the sector as a whole will overcome roadblocks and continue on the road to self-reliance.

The framework is also centered around human performance and organizational performance technologies, applying theories and approaches adapted from Six Sigma, Kaizan and others.<sup>xxiii</sup> According to USAID, “capacity is expressed through performance, and capacity development measurement must be centered on organizational performance.”<sup>xxiv</sup> Our commitment to building capacity is rooted in the belief that performance and internal structures and systems make profit and performance possible. This framework connects to the larger vision for the Journey to Self-Reliance while focusing specifically on organizational development.



Along the journey to self-reliance, there are also fundamental elements that must be developed if organizations are to be sustained. Those cross-cutting elements are **resiliency**, so that organizations are flexible and adaptive in the face of unexpected shifts or shocks, and **community**, where the community is responsive, aligning with and accountable to the culture in which they work. According to USAID, "transformative capacity refers to the governance mechanisms, policies and regulations, cultural and gender norms, infra-structure, community networks, and formal and informal social protection mechanisms that constitute the enabling environment for systemic change."<sup>xxv</sup>

#### **Crosscutting fundamental elements:**

**Resiliency:** This element is inclusive of organizations' culture and commitment to reform as well as the supportive capacity of the external environment. As organizations develop their capacity and improve their performance, they must also be instituting policies and processes to ensure that they are resilient to any external shocks, crises, or roadblocks. For the external environment, this element is looking at where the political and regulatory environment does and does not support business growth in Haiti and how this external environment supports the resiliency of local organizations.

**Community:** This element is woven into the assessment framework and is looking at accountability mechanisms, equitable hiring opportunities, and communication mechanisms that allow exchange and participation between the constituency (beneficiaries) and the infrastructure communities. The importance of community responsiveness is rooted in the importance of looking at the country through a holistic lens to ensure that USAID and partners are positioning Haiti, through all sectors, to progress down the road to self-reliance. Many of the constituency-focused indicators for this theme were developed based on the Power Africa Guide to Community Engagement.<sup>xxvi</sup>

Using findings from the analysis, this report is intended to inform USAID on strategic infrastructure and capacity building investments in Haiti that would advance self-reliance and sustainability. The recommendations provided in the **Recommendations** section highlights overarching investments that will build the foundation for longer term success and improved self-reliance in the infrastructure sector in Haiti; and specifies interventions that will be shorter term to sustain momentum and achieve quicker wins. The recommendations are centered around innovative approaches to organizational development (OD) and capacity building<sup>xxvii</sup> using human performance technology.<sup>xxviii</sup> The assessment team has also identified opportunities to strengthen USAID support and partnerships in areas training, OD, and performance improvement could bring measurable results. Ultimately, implementation of these recommendations will lead to effective quality improvement mechanisms amongst the infrastructure community, increased community responsiveness and collaboration, and advancement on the journey to self-reliance.

## ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

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### Methodology

This assessment used a mixed methods approach, using both quantitative data, collected through written and electronic quantitative surveys and qualitative data, collected through two-weeks of key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs) in Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien. WHER triangulated that data with available information synthesized through a rapid desk review of relevant literature. The team chose a mixed method assessment because the approach: (1) strengthens the reliability of data and validity of findings and recommendations by triangulating methods and data sources; (2) provides greater breadth and depth of understanding of the challenges and opportunities for capacity development; and (3) integrates contextual factors that will improve the design and implementation of the project.

### Desk Review

High-level results of the desk review have been discussed above under the **Background and Context** section. The desk review also informed the assessment approach and methodology, list of stakeholders, and framework construction. The reviewed literature included project reports and evaluations, government policies and guidelines, news articles, USAID guidelines, and organizational development theory papers. A list of resources used to formulate the framework and approach are listed in **Appendix C**.

### Quantitative Data Collection

Quantitative information was collected through written and electronic surveys. Questions were based on the assessment framework and were tailored to different respondent groups. In other words, across each participant group, the measurement areas and indicators (1-4 per measurement area) remained the same, but questions under each indicator varied depending on the relevance to group of respondents (students, implementing partners, contractors, government, or donor). Based on the group, the surveys ranged from approximately 15-50 questions-contractors received the longest survey, while the survey for government officials was shortened to respect their time and allow for more discussion. Respondents were prompted to select a numerical score between 0 and 3 representing their answer to each question, with zero representing the lowest score and three the highest. Illustrative examples of questions and the corresponding scoring system are provided below in **Table 1**. The full data collection tools are included in **Appendix D**.

**TABLE 1: ILLUSTRATIVE SURVEY QUESTIONS AND SCORING**

Thematic Area	Indicator	Illustrative Question	Survey Scoring
Supportive External Environment	Country Systems that Support Implementation	In Haiti, are the building codes clear and understandable?	<p>0– Building code is not complete</p> <p>1– Building code exists but needs improvement or updating</p> <p>2– Building code is complete and clear but not enforced</p> <p>3– Building code is complete, clear, implemented nationally, and enforced</p>
Culture and Commitment to Reform	Culture	In general, do architecture, engineering, and construction firms in Haiti have anti-corruption efforts?	<p>0– There are no mechanisms to guard against corruption</p> <p>1– Mechanisms exist but are ineffective in preventing corruption</p> <p>2– Mechanisms in place but are not applied consistently</p> <p>3– Mechanisms in place, enforced, and effective</p>
Technical Capacity	Supportive Processes / Practices	In general, do architecture, engineering, and construction firms in Haiti have processes for delivery in place (logistics, supply chain, tracking)?	<p>0– Never</p> <p>1– Hardly ever</p> <p>2– Sometimes</p> <p>3– Always</p>
Operational Capacity	Sound Financial Management	In general, do architecture, engineering, and construction firms in Haiti have financial management systems in place?	<p>0– No financial systems</p> <p>1– Very low quality and/or limited systems</p> <p>2– Some systems</p> <p>3– Strong systems</p>



Thematic Area	Indicator	Illustrative Question	Survey	Scoring
Sector Performance	Quality Results	In general, do architecture, engineering, and construction projects in Haiti come in on time? On budget?		0– Never 1– Hardly ever 2– Sometimes 3– Always

## Qualitative Data Collection

Qualitative information was collected through FGDs and KIIs. The data collection team posed open-ended questions to allow for discussion and deeper reflection and to capture concerns or suggestions not included in the quantitative framework. The data collection team had semi-structured discussion guides so that questions could be tailored to the interviewee or discussion group. Tools were tested and then refined throughout the assessment based on findings. Probing questions were expanded upon throughout the interview or discussion to react to (or provide a dive deeper into) responses. Below are several illustrative examples of the types of questions that were posed:

What do you view as the biggest challenge working with local organizations? In the current policy environment?

What suggestions do you have for building a greater sense of community in the A&E sector?

Are there areas where you believe your organization could benefit from training?

What worries you most about the future of the construction and engineering sector in Haiti? Why does this worry you or what is the reason you believe this is happening?

What do you feel most confident about for the future of the construction / engineering sector in Haiti? Please explain. Why does this make you feel confident about the sector?

Tools were translated into French and most interviews and discussions were conducted in French with the support of a local translator.

## Sample

Through 12 KIIs and 7 FGDs, a total of 72 persons participated in the assessment. A range of groups were included in the assessment to account for multiple perspectives and opinions. KIIs were conducted with government officials from the national and sub-national levels to understand government priorities and challenges as well as local concerns and challenges in operationalizing strategies and achieving objectives. Implementing partners (IPs) were invited to participate in FGDs to discuss relevant and ongoing infrastructure projects and to yield deeper insight into the dynamics of working in Haiti, with USAID, and with local partners. Also, through FGDs, local contractors—individuals as well as small businesses—provided critical inputs on the Haitian work environment and additional perspectives on working with USAID. Students were included in the assessment through FGDs to better understand the

education, learning, and working opportunities for architecture and engineering students and recent graduates. This group was the most well-represented in the assessment. Finally, the assessment included the perspectives of USAID, faith-based organizations, and a local water users association to ensure a complete picture from donor to beneficiary. More details on the sample are included below in **Table 2**.

TABLE 2: ASSESSMENT SAMPLE

Location	Group	Organization or agency	Type	Total #
Port-au-Prince	Government	FENAMH, UCLBP, MTPTC, P.V. Town Hall Engineering Department, UTE	KIIs	6
	Implementing partners	AECOM, WOCCU, IOM, GHSC-PSM, Papyrus	FGDs	11
	Contractors	Various individuals and companies (local and international)	FGD	11
	Students	Université Ruben Leconte and Université Américaine des Sciences Modernes d'Haïti	FGD	24
	Constituents	Faith based organization	KII	2
Cap-Haïtien	Government	Organisation de Gestion de la Destination Nord Haïti, Chambre de Commerce du Nord	KIIs	2
	Implementing partners	DAI	KIIs	2
	Contractors	Various individuals and companies (local and international)	FGD	3
	Students	Université Roi Henri Christophe	FGD	5
	Constituents	Faith based organization (1), Water Users Association (local farmers) (4)	KII, FGD	5
	Donor	USAID	KII	1
Total			12 KIIs 7 FGDs	72

## Approach to Data Analysis

### Quantitative Data

As described in the **Methodology** section, the assessment collected data on a 0-3 scale for each quantitative question. These data were then analyzed independently and compared across data collection modalities to triangulate the results. **Figure 3** is an illustrative example of this process. In Figure three, we show a snapshot of the larger data analysis spreadsheet, in this case showing the data

for the participants from contractors' group. The snapshot shows the response scores from the first three survey participants (participant 1, 2, and 3) out of the total (which included 15 individual participants). Note that the averages shown below are the real averages of the findings representing all 15 participant scores, not just the three participant scores used in the snapshot illustration. Within a participant group, responses (scores) to each question were averaged (**step 1 in Figure 3**). These averages to a question were then averaged to form an indicator score, which was then aggregated with other scores to form measurement area scores (**step 2 in Figure 3**). Question, indicator, and measurement areas were also aggregated across participant groups to analyze collective messages and common perspectives.

**FIGURE 3: DATA ANALYSIS SPREADSHEET SNAPSHOT**

Indicator	Scoring	Average ( <i>across all participants</i> )	Participant 1	Participant 2	Participant 3
Measurement Area: Sector Performance		1.7			
Indicator: Quality Results		1.5			
Projects come in on time	0- never; 1 hardly ever; 2 sometimes; 3 always  <b>Step 2</b>	1.2	1	1	1
Projects come in on budget		1.5	1	2	1
Meeting quality standards		1.8	1	2	2
Indicator: Sustainably Resourced		1.9			
Making a profit	0- never; 1 hardly ever; 2 sometimes; 3 always	2	2	2	2
Revenue Generation		1.9	3	2	2

To provide visualizations of findings in each measurement area and for each indicator, data was mapped on to star charts and bar charts. **Figure 4** shows how measurement area scores from three different stakeholder groups can be mapped on to a star chart together to allow for comparison—an analysis of this chart is provided below in the **findings** section. A score of three is the most desirable while a score


of zero is the least desirable—individual scoring mechanisms were described above under the **Quantitative Data Collection** section and are further detailed in **Appendix D**. These charts allow for a high-level snapshot of challenges and successes across the measurement areas. Data points closer to the center represent lower scores and data points toward the edge of the star represent higher scores. In the figure below (Figure 4) for example, a pentagon where all of the graphed lines (each representing the aggregated responses of each individual respondent group) would expand out to the furthest boundary (representing the most desirable score level) of the figure and would represent a more capable, effective, and efficient infrastructure sector. A pentagon where the graphed lines hug more closely to the center of the figure would represent a sector that needs significant investment. This data visualization approach allows for easy digestion of data, comparisons across respondent groups, and simple tracking of progress over time. This form of data visualization also makes it easier for solutions to be prioritized and tied to measurable outcomes and impact.

Star charts, sometimes called spider charts or spider web charts, can be used to show improvements over time. If this assessment were to be conducted again after the implementation of various recommendations provided in this report, the figure would expand as data points moved further from the center. The goal would be to achieve aggregated scores that are all (from all the respondent groups) mapped at the highest score (3) and thus fall on the outer lines of the shape.

Here the figure shows all five areas explored in the assessment. If interventions improve all the areas except for one, for example, the shape resulting plotting those responses on the star chart would be skewed with one part of the pentagon sinking toward the middle. That may prompt the analyst or stakeholder to then refer to the star chart that plots the individual metrics within that one area to see if some metrics scored higher than others, again presented through a clear visualization of the data.


These star charts also allow for comparison across participant groups showing the responses of each respondent group separately (signified by different color lines) reduces, or acknowledges, some of the bias and accounts for varying perspectives. For example, while all opinions are valid, the opinion of the government on laws and policies should not be considered the same as the opinion of students who may not have had direct experience working with these policies.

**FIGURE 4: EXAMPLE DATA ANALYSIS STAR CHART**



Bar charts are included to break down the star charts and show more detail under each measurement area while at the same time aggregating scores from the questions under the indicator (see **Figure 5**). For example, the “supportive external environment” measurement area has three indicators which help explain the overall score for that measurement area. One of these is “enforcement”, which aggregates scores from several questions regarding inspections, if compliance is mandatory, and if there are professional associations to support the infrastructure community to comply.

**FIGURE 5: EXAMPLE DATA ANALYSIS BAR CHART**



Qualitative data was analyzed by the data collection team who reviewed transcripts for themes, patterns, and quotes that represented common perspectives and unique insights.

## Limitations

There were several limitations to the sample and to the assessment in general. First, due to the timing of the assessment, which fell immediately after several incidences of security risk and thus limited the available respondents, the sample size was relatively limited, risking an incomplete picture of the situation in Haiti and limiting the variation of perspectives and opinions. Similarly, as the assessment was conducted in only two sites, findings can not necessarily be extrapolated to the entire country. Third, most of the FGDs and KIIs were conducted in French. While the data collection team speaks French and a translator was used, there is a possibility that some information was lost in translation. Fourth, there is a possibility that some of the quantitative questions were not understood in the way that they were intended. Evidence of this includes the fact that the “sustainably resourced” indicator, which includes questions on making a profit and generating revenue, received a high aggregated score in the quantitative survey but almost every respondent participating in the KIIs and FGDs revealed challenges with financial resources. Fifth and finally, as this was a USAID assessment, perspectives on USAID could have been biased or influenced.

## FINDINGS

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### Overall Strengths, Challenges, and Priorities


Quantitative findings reveal strengths, opportunities, and significant challenges across the infrastructure sector, including organizational capacity public sector commitment and governance, and work environment, which facilitate or obstruct productivity and growth. Qualitative interviews and focus group discussions also revealed deeper challenges as well as strengths in the sector and opportunities for further investment. These issues are explored in the sections to follow.

**Figure 6** below shows a high-level snapshot of the aggregated scores under each measurement area. A score of three is the most desirable while a score of zero is the least desirable—individual scoring mechanisms were described above under the **Quantitative Data Collection** section and are further detailed in **Appendix D**.


“Sector performance” was the highest scoring measurement area overall—meaning it was the area of greatest success or fewest challenges—and “supportive external environment” was the lowest scoring area—meaning the questions under this measurement area produced the lowest scores or were perceived to be areas of greater weakness or challenge. It is worth noting that on a 0-3 scale, the highest measurement area score was not above a 1.8, signaling overall low confidence or opinions on processes, capacity, and outcomes across the infrastructure sector. **Figure 7** disaggregates these same scores by participant group. Additional highlights from **Figure 7** include: the contractors scored their technical capacity the highest but gave lower scores for culture and commitment to reform and to supportive external environment; and students generally gave higher scores compared to the other participant groups.



FIGURE 6: VISUALIZATION OF AGGREGATED DATA SHOWING SCORES FOR EACH OF THE FIVE MEASUREMENT AREAS




**FIGURE 7: VISUALIZATION OF AGGREGATED DATA SHOWING SCORES FOR EACH OF THE FIVE MEASUREMENT AREAS, BY PARTICIPANT GROUP**




**Figure 8** below disaggregates indicator scores from their measurement areas to provide more detail on greatest challenges and successes. It shows the aggregated scores for all indicators (under the measurement areas) included in the assessment. “Country systems” and “country policies” were lowest. **Figure 9** further disaggregates these scores by participant group. As can be seen in figure nine, students overall provided higher scores across indicators while contractors gave the lowest. The highest indicator score is “sustainably resourced” and the lowest is “country policies and practices that promote resilience”. Figure nine highlights where respondent groups diverged in opinion—namely regarding human resources, learning and collaboration, work ethic, and country systems that support implementation—and where they generally agreed—sustainable resources, country policies and practices that promote resilience, and financial management. This chart also highlights areas in need of investment or intervention and shows how much room there is for improvement across every area of the infrastructure sector.

**FIGURE 8: VISUALIZATION OF AGGREGATED DATA SHOWING SCORES FOR EACH INDICATOR**



**FIGURE 9: VISUALIZATION OF AGGREGATED DATA SHOWING SCORES FOR EACH INDICATOR, BY PARTICIPANT GROUP**



**Table 3** below summarizes the quantitative findings numerically.

**TABLE 3: QUANTITATIVE SURVEY RESULTS**

Measurement areas and indicators	Contractors	Government	Students	Total
<b>Supportive External Environment</b>	<b>0.93</b>	<b>1.06</b>	<b>1.32</b>	<b>1.10</b>
Country policies and practices that promote resilience	1.09	1.17	1.02	1.09
Country systems that support implementation	0.88	1.17	1.36	1.13
Enforcement	1.14	0.83	1.59	1.19
<b>Culture and Commitment to Reform</b>	<b>1.23</b>	<b>1.62</b>	<b>1.54</b>	<b>1.47</b>
Culture	1.27	1.67	1.29	1.41
Work ethic	1.57	1.40	1.90	1.62
Learning and collaboration	0.86	1.80	1.44	1.37
<b>Technical Capacity</b>	<b>1.73</b>	<b>1.33</b>	<b>1.52</b>	<b>1.53</b>
Supportive Processes/Practices	1.73	1.33	1.52	1.53
<b>Operational Capacity</b>	<b>1.46</b>	<b>1.39</b>	<b>1.12</b>	<b>1.32</b>
Sound Financial Management	1.45	1.50		1.47
Competent Human Resources	1.63	1.17	1.17	1.32
Effective Organizational Management	1.31	1.50	1.07	1.29
<b>Sector Performance</b>	<b>1.71</b>	<b>1.73</b>	<b>1.92</b>	<b>1.79</b>
Quality Results	1.50	1.39	1.69	1.53
Sustainably resourced	1.93	2.07	2.14	2.04
<b>Average</b>	<b>1.38</b>	<b>1.42</b>	<b>1.48</b>	<b>1.42</b>

Quantitative findings reveal significant challenges across the infrastructure sector, from the organizational characteristics—such as technical and management capacity—to the public sector characteristics—such a commitment to reform—to a work environment conducive to productive and

growth. Qualitative interviews and focus groups also revealed strengths in the sector and opportunities for enhanced investment.

## Strengths and Success

A USAID success that was echoed across most discussions was USAID's requirement for several IPs to incorporate capacity-building components into their construction projects and infrastructure programs (through internships, trainings, skills building workshops, etc.). These initiatives show that USAID and partners are investing in local ownership and positioning partners for sustainable advancement. There is an opportunity to build on these sustainability investments in future bids and to improve indicator scores across the assessment framework.

Another success is seen in the relationship between USAID and the Government of Haiti. The respondents from the national and local Governments indicated that USAID and IPs have been successful in reaching out during program implementation, in involving them in their work, and in communicating about program status and plans. Multiple assessment participants noted that good communication between USAID, the Government of Haiti, and community members (beneficiaries of construction programs) has improved project implementation and has ensured local support and sustainability.

## Opportunities for Improvement

While challenges with government turnover and instability are significant in Haiti, there is an opportunity for greater engagement of the government during planning periods.

*"The projects don't originate from us. They are made in Port-au-Prince or in Washington. I keep telling them to come see us."*— Cap-Haïtien government official

Implementing partners also felt that there was a good working relationship between the IPs and USAID. While there were challenges, which will be explored in greater detail below, IPs generally expressed appreciation for USAID's ability to understand the challenging work environment in Haiti—with the government, policies, fiscal volatility, local technical capacity, and unforeseen delays—and to be flexible and adaptive to these challenges.

Finally, a major success and area of opportunity is the desire for greater autonomy and sustainability across local contractors and government officials. These groups and IPs are excited about USAID's focus on self-reliance and feel that these efforts are in line with their own priorities. Therefore, framing projects, policies, and investments in this light will help ensure support from the government and local partners. This support highlights the timely opportunity for USAID to capitalize on this enthusiasm and build momentum towards the goals of self-reliance, resilience, and sustainability.

*"Haiti needs to go beyond charity to investment and partnerships. We are not there yet but we will be. Haiti needs to become a land of opportunity. People need to know that the funding will not go on forever."*— Government official

*"Our future is related to the future of the country. We must create the possibilities. We are very excited about this sector and love this work, we believe that there will be more opportunities for us in the future."*— Student

*“Haiti has to build our country on our own, but we need your support to get there.” –Contractor*

*“We can’t be pessimistic because there will be a revolution in our way to think and establish new policies to put the country in a better place. This change belongs to us Haitians. We need to be autonomous.”—Student*

In light of this, USAID should consider increasing collaboration and highlight those collaborations with Haitian stakeholders at the front end of project design to an even greater degree. This will ensure that projects are designed with Haitians and with Haitian beneficiaries in mind. This process will also contribute to building local capacity and ensuring greater autonomy and self-reliance. This will also ensure local buy-in and contribute to sustainability.

*“We need to stop getting jobs that were designed overseas not by Haitian people or even for Haiti with Haitian capacities in mind.” –Contractor*

Furthermore, involving local partners in planning will facilitate the sustainability planning process that was recommended by the Office of the Inspector General in the 2014 audit report of USAID/Haiti’s Health Infrastructure Program:

*“Develop, in collaboration with the Haitian Government, sustainability plans for each of the infrastructure projects that (1) include mechanisms to make sure the Haitian Government formally commits funds in its official budget that cover the projected costs (both financial and human resources) to maintain and use the project, and (2) include targets the Haitian Government must meet that indicate progress toward meeting its commitment to fund, maintain, and use the projects.”<sup>xix</sup>*


Qualitative assessment findings are explored in greater detail in the sections to follow, organized according to measurement area.

## **Supportive External Environment**

The government perceived enforcement to be the greatest challenge to the sector. However, other participants had varied perspectives on enforcement. For example, while the government gave enforcement a score of 0.83 (the lowest individual indicator score across the assessment), students gave enforcement a moderate score (1.5) signaling that they felt that there was enforcement of laws, codes and policies.

As previously discussed, when looking at overall scores across the measurement areas, the “external environment” scores were consistently the lowest. This section provides a deeper look. **Figure 10** shows how across the “supportive external environment” measurement area, the assessment participants gave the indicators relatively equal—and equally low—scores. None of the indicators scored higher than a 1.2, resulting in the “supportive external environment” having the lowest overall average score across all of the measurement areas. Furthermore, the indicator measuring “country policies and practices that promote resilience” received the lowest score across all indicators (1.09), with the students providing the lowest score. In other words, across the quantitative assessment, the participants perceived country policies to be the greatest challenge to the sector.

**FIGURE 10: SUB-INDICATOR RESULTS FOR SUPPORTIVE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT**



Qualitative information sheds light on some of these figures. As discussed in the background section, there has been an incredible amount of fiscal volatility and government instability over the past few years. This has a direct impact on contractors’ and USAID implementing partners’ ability to finish programs on time and on budget. Contractors spoke to these challenges, explaining that planning can be difficult when commitments of the Haitian government are not upheld.

“The government may pledge millions of dollars for your project, but that pledge means nothing. how can we plan when we don't know the reality? The government budgets year to year but they promised all this money up front on multi-year projects.” —Contractor

Government officials recognized these challenges with contracts or pledges not being met, highlighting the role that fiscal volatility plays.

“Money that you planned to receive when you signed the contract for is not the same as the money you will get. In two years, the cement doubled in price. So, you have to pay twice as much with the same or less money. We know we need contracts that allow for this change and that are flexible.” – Government official

Companies can experience challenges to paying wages and finishing programs due to complications outside of their control. However, students and contractors noted that there are insufficient labor laws to protect workers when this happens.

“Most of the time we get contracts to execute a project, then there are changes in the government it affects the quality of the project. Civil unrest and changes in the government affects the timing and cost. And we get penalized.” —Contractor

“When you get hired for a job, even if you have signed a contract you sometimes don’t get paid what they agreed. When there is civil unrest, they subtract from your wages. The law does not protect us when the employer does not respect the contract.” —Student

Labor laws are not the only laws that are insufficient or not properly implemented. Across the board, all assessment participants spoke to the challenges with national policies, stating that even when they exist, they are not respected, upheld, enforced, or effective.

*“There are not effective, they all over the place. There are laws and policies, etc. but they are not effective”*—Student

Part of the challenge, according to assessment participants, is that policies regarding construction and infrastructure are not clear or easy to understand. They are not known to the general public, and therefore cannot be respected. Still, this is the responsibility of the government to disseminate laws and policies and the enforce them. Yet according to all participant groups, this is a major weakness of the government.

For example, community members often ignore government policies around housing codes which are meant to ensure homes are built to survive earthquakes and hurricanes. This is an area where skilled engineers can support community members and ensure that they are respecting government codes. However, according to multiple contractors, the government does not enforce these codes which disincentivizes community members from paying for engineers.

*“People do not have financial means to apply what the norm is, what the law is. They should hire engineers to get their work done properly. But government should require everyone to have engineers as they are required to do.”*—Contractor

*“People in their mindset say they cannot afford engineers, so they just hire anyone who is not trained, who does not know the codes and will not do it right.”* —Student

In the aftermath of the earthquake and hurricane, one of the greatest challenges for construction and infrastructure projects and sources of grievances for the Haitian people were land-related issues.<sup>xxx</sup> Implementing partners, government officials, and contractors spoke to the unorganized system for land titles—multiple titles may exist for one plot of land, causing disputes between different parties and delaying construction. This reflects findings from the literature. In Haiti, there is not an effective national register, so the country lacks a comprehensive, functional system for recording land ownership. Customary, informal arrangements characterize land tenure in Haiti, with only 40% of landowners possessing documentation such as a legal title or transaction receipt. Given the limited extent of formal titling and concerns regarding the accuracy of existing records, those without formal documentation risk loss of their land or property.<sup>xxxi</sup>

Part of challenges with land titling are tied to broader issues around urban planning. Government officials spoke to a lack of vision for urban development. Port-au-Prince is a growing city, but it is expanding without a clear plan. The Government of Haiti, according to assessment participants, needs to have a vision for development and a long-term approach to achieving that vision. Government officials spoke to the need to switch from an emergency response mindset to a development mindset, but expressed the need for leadership, visioning, and planning training in order to do so.

Finally, corruption issues within the government were brought up by almost every participant group, but the details of corruption were not discussed at length and were not a primary focus of the assessment. Several participants seemed uncomfortable discussing corruption while others mentioned that it was pervasive and a significant barrier to their work performance in Haiti without providing specific




examples or explanations. This corruption could lead to mismanagement of finances within the government (which could in turn impact infrastructure projects) or could influence outcomes.

Strengthening the supportive external environment, including the improvement and enforcement of labor laws, clarification and consistency in land titling, and elimination of corruption, will require collaboration across sectors. USAID/Haiti can lead these efforts, strengthening the coordination across the different sectors and offices within the Mission. The infrastructure sector office could benefit from collaboration with the office of democracy, human rights, and governance and with the agriculture, WASH, and health offices. The infrastructure sector office could also benefit from greater collaboration with the education sector to ensure quality education of architect and engineering students, and with any other sectors implementing capacity building initiatives.

## Culture and Commitment to Reform

**Figure 11** below breaks down the “culture and commitment to reform” measurement area, showing that learning and collaboration received the lowest overall score while work ethic received the highest. Interestingly, it is the government that thinks there is poorer work ethic among contractors and firms within the infrastructure sector. Students, yet to be in the sector, feel the work ethic is better. The opposite is true for learning and collaboration—the government thinks that this is moderately a strength while contractors feel that that is a major weakness.

**FIGURE 11: SUB-INDICATOR RESULTS FOR CULTURE AND COMMITMENT TO REFORM**



Qualitative findings shed light on some of these challenges. First, participant groups discussed challenges with learning and collaboration among the infrastructure community itself and also with the government and with local beneficiaries (constituents).

*“Cooperation needs to be established between the mayors and the executives of the companies. But also the problem is that they do not get involved with the communities. They will help people but there is no direct collaboration between the companies and the neighborhoods.”—Contractor*


One way of fostering collaboration, learning, and coordination is through a professional association. The assessment revealed mixed feelings about the existence and effectiveness of a professional association for architects or engineers. While a few participants noted that these professional associations do exist, most thought that they did not. This reveals a gap in knowledge of these associations and of the effectiveness of them. Participants who were aware of professional associations for architects or engineers mentioned that they were ineffective or did not do any concrete activities. Professional associations, when effective, can be excellent facilitators of trainings or learning sessions. They can also ensure standardization of approaches, implementation of best practices, and adherence to codes and regulations. Part of this process of ensuring quality is through licensure, which is discussed in the following section.

## Technical Capacity

The technical capacity measurement area has only one indicator—supportive processes and practice.

**Figure 12** shows that while participant groups gave similar scores, the government gave the lowest scores for the sector’s technical capacity while the contractors gave the highest. Questions under this indicator measured ease of access to materials, steady and affordable energy supply, delivery processes (logistics and supply chain), procurement processes and the existence of technologies and operating systems.

**FIGURE 12: SUB-INDICATOR RESULTS FOR TECHNICAL CAPACITY**



Many of the challenges with technical capacity are rooted in structural issues around education, community acceptance of policies, limited access to resources (materials and financial), language barriers, insufficient training, and limited understanding of codes and standards. Students have mixed perspectives on the quality of their education—some participants noted that their education was excellent, but that was only because they went to a top University; other students discussed how their education was too theoretical and they graduated without understanding how to apply their knowledge. The first challenge regarding standardized quality of education could be addressed through a more rigorous accreditation program for architect and engineering schools and a standardized curriculum across the country. The second challenge regarding applied knowledge could be addressed through internships.

Many students and contractors cited lack of internships or practical training as the biggest challenge in the infrastructure sector. Students graduate with limited practical skills and no experience as they enter the job market, which limits their employability.

*“As students we have gained knowledge of entrepreneurship and technical skills, but we don’t know how to apply those skills. We are technically capable but do not have the understanding of how to apply it. That makes it hard to get a job.”—Student*

*“They don’t have a lab or internship to practice. It would be so helpful for them to work in firm or on project. We would get lots of support for that.”—Contractor*

*“Companies require experience but it’s hard to get experience. Where do we start?”—Student*

*“There is lots of building happening right now. But they don’t invite us as new generation of professionals.”—Student*

Even as professionals continue their careers, there are limited opportunities for growing and gaining new skills. Trainings through professional associations, as discussed above, could be beneficial, but there is also a need for continuous on-the-job learning and capacity building. Several contractors and implementing partners noted that capacity building efforts could be a part of sub-awards from USAID IPs to local firms. However, contractors noted that they are often not even given these opportunities for growth because they do not have the skills going into the bidding process. Therefore, international firms and workers are often given these opportunities instead of Haitian.

*“Another challenge is the technical aspects of the job- they are becoming more sophisticated design wise and small companies cannot pay highly qualified professionals to do that. Where could we even find these professionals?”—Contractor*

*“You have 10 years of experience, but really you have one year you did 10 times because there are not opportunities for growing and learning.”—Government official*

*“We should require that contractors include training--transform school learning into practical application and quality assurance as part of their plan. Make capacity building as part of their plan!”—Contractor*

Assessment participants agreed that no licensure programs for architects, engineers, masons, electricians, or similar professions exist, but they would be useful. Currently, if a student graduates from a certified university, they are “licensed” to work in that field. However, there are quality issues around university degrees, which will be discussed below. Without licensure, it is difficult to determine whether a professional has the appropriate technical skills to do a job to the highest standards. Professional associations, with the right technical guidance, could develop a licensing process, including a national exam and a certificate. This certificate could then be required for all professionals in the infrastructure community, which would standardize quality and also bolster confidence in the sector that local professionals (as opposed to foreign workers) are qualified to do the job.

*“We need to do what did for nurses—make a national exam—one exam that will make diplomas valid. Will mean you are licensed to work. We should make it so that professional groups have an exam to be admitted to work as an engineer and you can’t work for anybody without passing that exam.”—Implementing Partner*


*“We have schools but no certified institution that puts everyone through a test- like a board or a license. We don’t have that and need one!”—Contractor*

## **Operational Capacity**

Under the “operational capacity” measurement area, there are three indicators measuring financial management human resources, and organizational management within Haitian firms and organizations. **Figure 13** shows that the questions under effective organizational management received the lowest scores while the questions under financial management received the highest. As can be seen in figure 13, students were not asked about the financial management of firms and contractors within the

infrastructure sector. Also of note, the contractors gave higher scores to the questions regarding human resources compared to the other groups.

**FIGURE 13: SUB-INDICATOR RESULTS FOR OPERATIONAL CAPACITY**



One of the gaps in curricula for architect and engineering programs is a focus on business skills—from financial to program management. Students and contractors alike discussed how a dearth of these skills amongst Haitian professionals was limiting their ability to start, effectively manage, and grow businesses.

*“We need to think about how local firms are thinking—they were not exposed to information about how to manage people and grow a company. It is very important to work with them on managing teams, resources, and ensuring quality. It’s hard to reach international standards when they are not being taught that. We assume that people share the same knowledge and understanding but that’s not the case.”—Implementing Partner*

*“Training in negotiation and management would be helpful. We are not trained in management or business. How can we run the sector without this knowledge?”—Contractor*

Haitian architects, engineers, and business owners in the infrastructure sector do not have training in bidding on donor-funded projects, which limits their ability to win projects as a prime recipient. Multiple contractors noted that they are not aware of when USAID is requesting proposals, where to find announcements and materials, and how to properly prepare a project proposal. There are also many requirements for proposals that are challenging for local organizations, especially small businesses, to meet. Implementing partners and contractors both suggested either incorporating lessons on business development and bidding in architect and engineering curricula or developing a training series on business development, bidding, project management, navigating USAID/Haiti’s procurement system, and USAID rules and requirements. If the latter were developed, participants noted that USAID could establish a system of certifying organizations and qualifying them to receive funding. This suggestion is further explored in the next section.

*“USAID wants to find new partners. We need to build their capacity so that they can be implementers later on for USAID.”—Implementing Partner*

*“Make it a requirement that schools teach them the words that are used in bidding.”—Contractor*

Participants discussed how there is also nepotism within companies’ human resource practices and partnerships.

*“Sometimes the local firms may advertise local opportunities, but they will choose someone they know or have connections – it’s called nepotism.” —Student*


Finally, some challenges with operational capacity, including the ability to manage programs effectively, are rooted in some difficulties that the Haitian organizations and implementing partners report experiencing working with USAID. Multiple implementing partners discussed the challenges of turnover within the Mission, explaining how these transitions can set their programs back and delay implementation. Therefore, USAID/Haiti should ensure that there are sufficient technical staff within the Mission and improve transitions across staffing changes for continuity on programs. This could be achieved through longer and more effective onboarding processes. This recommendation is in line with one provided by the Inspector General in the same audit report mentioned above:

*“We recommend that USAID/Haiti complete its staffing plan by hiring the appropriate number of technical and contracting staff with engineering and construction expertise to manage the mission’s infrastructure program properly.”<sup>xxxii</sup>*

## Sector Performance

**Figure 14** displays the results for the two indicators under the “sector performance” measurement area, which received the highest overall score. As the figure shows, both indicators received high scores, but “sustainably resourced” was the highest overall across all of the indicators. The students especially gave high scores to the questions under this indicator—whether contractors and local firms make a profit and generate revenue

FIGURE 14: SUB-INDICATOR RESULTS FOR SECTOR PERFORMANCE



All of the challenges outlined above in the previous sections have a result on the performance of the sector, especially regarding the quality of results. Assessment participants noted that due the challenges with government turnover, fiscal volatility, civil unrest, language barriers, low technical capacity, weak financial management, and poor program management, projects rarely, if ever, come in on time and on budget. Interestingly, while the indicator measuring “sustainably resourced” received the highest scores on the quantitative survey, almost every participant noted the challenges with securing sufficient funds to effectively manage programs and deliver high quality results.

*“This is a big disadvantage for the small enterprises – they are capable technically but not financially”—Contractor*

One of the greatest challenges for local firms is the performance bond requirements attached to most donor and government funded infrastructure projects. Local firms and contractors explained that they are required to have bond guarantees from banks, ranging from 30 to as high as 100% of their total funding amount. These bonds are arduous and difficult to secure; and it can cripple the organization if they are unable to meet the bond requirements.

*“The requirement from the bond is way too high—from 30 - 35%--sometimes 100%. It needs to be more like 10-15%. Otherwise there is no way for anyone to qualify for the bond--and then they end up taking money from one project to pay another.”—Implementing partner*

As the quote above mentions, some contractors and local firms use funding from one project to pay back loans or complete the work of another project, perpetuating a cycle of insufficient funding and financial mismanagement. This in part results from government delays in paying local firms for their work, import delays that hold up materials, and currency fluctuations. One way of avoiding this cycle of firms’ using advances or mobilization payments to pay off previous debts is to lower these initial payments. Multiple participants suggested advance amounts provided are higher than they needed to

be and recommended lowering the advance that firms receive while simultaneously lowering the burden of the bond.

*“If you give a local firm a job, they might use that money to pay the bills for other projects. The government is always delayed in paying them.”—Contractor*

Quality challenges and insufficient funding can frequently be traced back to the bidding process. According to implementing partners and contractors, certain individuals or organizations submit unreasonably low bids so that they can win the project. This sets them up for failure by committing to doing a project for less money than is required to do the work

*“In the past when they had to bid the person who proposed less money won the bid. The money that they asked for could not cover the project—that effects the quality.”—Contractor*

*“Low bidders mess everything up. We need a better vetting process to ensure that they can do it at the price, otherwise you can’t compete. Can’t do it. We don’t give good ones a chance.” — Contractor*

*“People sign the contract anyway even though they should know they cannot do it because they are optimistic— they think they will figure it out. But in the end, they cannot do it.” —Contractor*

Multiple contractors and implementing partners also spoke to the challenges of designing project specifications and plans in English and then translating them to French for Haitian contractors, employees, and partner firms. Therefore, WI-HER recommends that USAID consider increasing flexibility around language requirements, such as allowing implementing partners to submit plans in French. To do this, USAID would need to ensure broader language competencies in French and Creole within USAID/Haiti and among the leadership of implementing partners. Language barriers also have implications for bidding—USAID should consider releasing Requests for Proposals in French and allowing French proposal submissions. This will help local firms be more competitive in the bidding process.

*“We have to re-do specs in French after USAID approves them. There is also a lot of room for error and takes a lot of time. I feel that USAID needs to be able to work in French. Otherwise we have to search for engineers who speak English and that’s hard to find.”—Implementing partner*

*“USAID is always speaking in English, but locals are in Creole or French, so we have to explain everything in the language. This makes project management so hard for a USAID project because we always have to explain things a hundred times in different languages for people to understand.”—Implementing partner*

Finally, contractors and implementing partners discussed the possible benefits of establishing small business set-asides or small grants to vetted or pre-approved local contractors. After completing USAID rules and regulations training and meeting certain financial requirements, local organizations could be added to a list of USAID-approved local partners. These local organizations could then receive information about bids and opportunities.

## **Implementing Partner Perspective**

The implementing partners—international organizations that directly receive USAID funding to work in Haiti—received a separate quantitative survey which deviated slightly from the assessment framework.



Therefore, their quantitative survey responses are presented separately below, as opposed to being included in the aggregate figures above. This is because of their unique perspective and because they will be partners in efforts for the Journey to Self-Reliance rather than recipients of capacity building and support.

On the quantitative survey, IPs were asked to report their opinions on their own organization's performance and their experience working with local organizations, with USAID, and within the Haitian context in general. They were provided with the following instructions, "For each statement, please select the number of the score representing your answer—stating whether you strongly agree (3), agree (2), disagree (1), or strongly disagree (0). Please select only one score for each statement." The statements that received the highest self-reported scores included:

- Your organization is strong in engaging local organization for collaboration and building local capacity.
- Your organization's is strong in innovation and creativity.
- Your organization is strong in overcoming obstacles to engaging USAID in collaboration.
- Your organization adapts program design to respond to baseline findings and benchmark assessments.
- Your organization has strong project management skills.

The statements that received the lowest scores were:

- Local partners have capacity to deliver quality services and make a profit.
- USAID has a streamlined process to decrease bureaucracy.
- Competent local organizations across the sectors of the infrastructure community are available.
- USAID has realistic expectations in time required to implement.

## RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Based on assessment findings, several recommendations were developed to capitalize on opportunities, build on successes, fill gaps, and address challenges. These recommendations are inclusive of solutions for improved infrastructure sector outcomes, capacity building of local contractors and firms, and programs or activities that will contribute to sustainable development and ultimately greater self-reliance. **Table 4** below summarizes the findings (opportunities and challenges) outlined above—grouped by framework measurement areas—and maps them to specific recommendations. This table illustrates how each recommendation falls within the framework of the assessment and that the various proposed activities, policies, programs, and approaches link directly to the identified challenges and needs.

**TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS MAPPED TO RECOMMENDATIONS**

Measurement Areas	Findings: Challenges, Needs, and Opportunities	Recommendations
Supportive External Environment	Government instability Lack of institutional norms Corruption Unclear/weak policies Unclear land titles Ineffective labor laws	Build capacity of government in quality assurance and oversight Build government capacity to eliminate corruption Improve land titling system Work with the government to improve oversight and reduce fraud Work with the government on visioning and strategic planning
Culture and Commitment to Reform	No support systems for local infrastructure companies and contractors (no associations or opportunities for training) Lack of coordination between organizations Insufficient engagement of construction community with beneficiary community	Reinforce/build the capacity of the professional associations. USAID facilitate coordination.

Measurement Areas	Findings: Challenges, Needs, and Opportunities	Recommendations
Technical Capacity	<p>Limited understanding of codes and guidelines by local infrastructure organizations / contractors</p> <p>Insufficient practical training</p> <p>No standardized accreditation and licensure</p> <p>Language barriers between local infrastructure firms and contractors and USAID representatives and implementing partners</p>	<p>Accredit schools and standardize quality measures and curricula.</p> <p>Reinforce/build the capacity of the professional associations.</p> <p>Sub-contracting to local organizations; focus on capacity building.</p> <p>Create opportunities for internships.</p>
Operational Capacity	<p>Local infrastructure firms' lack of training in business</p> <p>Insufficient systems and capacity to bid on and manage projects</p> <p>Difficulty securing finances</p> <p>Nepotism in HR practices</p>	<p>Reinforce/build the capacity of the professional associations.</p> <p>Sub-contracting to local organizations; focus on capacity building.</p> <p>Training in organizational management and bidding.</p> <p>Create opportunities for internships.</p>
Sector Performance	Unrealistic bids affecting quality	Evaluate organizations during bidding, ensure bids are realistic

## Overarching Investments that will Build the Foundation for Longer Term Success

The recommendations listed in **Table 4** above include overarching investments that will build the foundation for longer term success and improved self-reliance in the infrastructure sector in Haiti; and specifies interventions that will be shorter term to sustain momentum and achieve quicker wins. In a 2017 US government led assessment, Haiti scored a 0.08 (on a 0-1 scale) for government effectiveness on the USAID Journey to Self-Reliance Scorecard measuring the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and its independence from political pressure, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to its stated policies. Therefore, these foundational investments for longer term success include investments for improved government capacity the infrastructure sector in Haiti, which will move the sector towards being more sustainable, resilient, and self-reliant.

**Quality and Oversight.** First, USAID and partners should continue to build the capacity of the government in quality assurance and oversight. Multiple assessment participants—including the government, contractors, and implementing partners—discussed the challenges of policy implementation and oversight. A common sentiment was that people did not respect established policies and norms, and the government did not have oversight capacity, which led to poor quality outcomes. Improving the government’s ability to provide oversight and quality assurance will help ensure that policies are adhered to, that infrastructure is built according to code, that land titles are respected, and that the government’s and donor’s investments are used efficiently.

**Eliminate Corruption.** In addition to building the government’s capacity for quality assurance and oversight, the infrastructure sector within USAID/Haiti has a unique opportunity to the overall improvement in capacity of the Government of Haiti and eliminate corruption by improving oversight and reducing fraud. USAID has an office of democracy, human rights, and governance with which the infrastructure sector could collaborate.<sup>xxxiii</sup> Building the government’s capacity in this regard will ultimately lead to greater self-reliance, sustainability, and resilience.

**Land-Titling.** Part of quality assurance is ensuring that land titles are respected. However, the land titling system in Haiti is incredibly flawed, with, for example, multiple titles existing for one piece of land. Participants discussed how multiple USAID and other donor-funded projects had to stop due to challenges with securing land rights. Improving land titling is also important for business investment and economic growth, promoting stability and reducing conflict, and improving resilience to natural disasters. USAID has experience globally supporting and building local capacity to lead and manage legal, policy, and institutional reforms for land titling.<sup>xxxiv</sup> USAID Haiti should leverage this expertise for the Haitian context.

**Education.** Finally, USAID should explore options for improving the quality of architecture and engineering schools across the country. USAID could work with the Government of Haiti to standardize curricula and build a robust and effective accreditation program. This will ensure that all students who are interested in becoming an architect or engineer can access a quality education and that they are prepared to enter the workforce upon their graduation. Ultimately, with improvements in the quality of education, local contractors and organizations will become increasingly capable of managing large and complex infrastructure programs, thus leading their own development.

## Shorter Term Investments

In addition to the foundational investments outlined above, USAID/Haiti and implementing partners such as AECOM and WI-HER can build momentum towards the goals of self-reliance by implementing programs and providing technical assistance to fill identified gaps and challenges. **Table 5** below outlines high-level recommendations along with illustrative activities and metrics. The activities are ones that were recommended by assessment participants or were developed by the assessment team to address specific identified challenges. The metrics are provided to illustrate how each activity could be continuously monitored to ensure that it is contributing to the goals of the journey to self-reliance. Suggestions for both output measurements—tracking products or activities—and outcome measurements—tracking achievements or changes based on activities—are provided. Furthermore, success with any of these activities would also contribute to improvements in the five areas of infrastructure sector development, which will result in shifts on the star-charts included above, and the bar charts as well.

TABLE 5: RECOMMENDATIONS WITH ACTIVITIES AND METRICS

High-level recommendations	Illustrative activities for USAID and partners	Illustrative metrics
Visioning and strategic planning.	Training workshops for government officials on visioning processes—especially related to urban planning—and developing tools and guidelines for strategic planning. Workshops would also guide government officials in developing benchmarks for accountability.	<b>Outputs:</b> Workshop held Strategy document with clear vision created by x# of ministries <b>Outcome:</b> Baseline/End line shows increased capacity in urban planning
Reinforce/build the capacity of the professional associations.	Create twinning programs with US-based associations to build the capacity of the Haitian architect and engineering associations. Provide technical assistance to professional associations on: Sustainable funding Licensure processes (to ensure that all engineers and architects are licensed, which will standardize quality) Developing performance standards Co-develop training materials for capacity building among members	<b>Outputs:</b> # of association-led trainings, supported by USAID # of twinning relationships established <b>Outcomes:</b> Increase in association membership Increased association capacity for local resource mobilization Increased # of trainings led by association Association charter and by-laws updated Effective licensure process implemented
USAID facilitates coordination	Coordinate more frequent sector meetings with implementing partners working with various donors (DFID, EU, World Bank, etc.) to ensure coordination within the infrastructure sector.	<b>Outputs:</b> # of partner meetings held # of new partnerships established across programs and sectors

High-level recommendations	Illustrative activities for USAID and partners	Illustrative metrics
	Coordinate more USAID implementing partner meetings to facilitate coordination across sectors.	<b>Outcome:</b> Baseline/End line shows increased coordination across sectors/projects
Sub-contracting to local organizations; focus on capacity building.	<p>Require that international organization prime recipients sub-contract a % of their contract to local organizations.</p> <p>Require that prime recipients have specific activities for capacity building of local contractors or firms.</p> <p>Create a system for training and then pre-qualifying local organizations to be prime recipients of USAID funds (the pre-qualification could be for various funding levels).</p> <p>Develop small set-asides for local organizations with fewer financial and reporting requirements.</p>	<b>Outcome:</b> # of organizations trained and pre-qualified. Guide developed for organizational capacity building for the infrastructure sector  <b>Output:</b> Amount of funding channeled through local organizations.
Training in organizational management and bidding.	<p>Create and implement program and organizational management trainings for local organizations.</p> <p>Establish a workshop series on managing USAID contracts which could include modules on:</p> <p>The bidding process and procurement system for USAID contracts</p> <p>USAID rules and regulations</p> <p>USAID contract compliance and reporting requirements</p>	<b>Output:</b> # of people trained in organizational management and bidding.  <b>Outcomes:</b> Baseline/End line shows increased capacity in organizational management % increase in local organizations bidding on USAID projects
Create opportunities for	Require contractors to host 1-2 interns per year from Haitian architect or	<b>Outputs:</b>

High-level recommendations	Illustrative activities for USAID and partners	Illustrative metrics
internships.	<p>engineering schools.</p> <p>Develop standard approaches for intern capacity building.</p>	<p>Internship program established</p> <p># of interns hosted by USAID-funded programs/year</p> <p><b>Outcome:</b></p> <p># of interns who successfully gain employment</p>

## Conclusion

This assessment tool proved to be a valuable measurement innovation for self-reliance. Further use of this tool would be valuable to USAID/Haiti and to other missions. It could also be applied to other sectors for rapid assessment and continual monitoring of progress.

Implementing the various recommendations provided above—the over-arching foundational investments and shorter term investments and initiatives—will not only strengthen the infrastructure sector in Haiti through improved capacity building and quality assurance but will also contribute to overall goals of sustainability and self-reliance. USAID/Haiti has a unique opportunity to leverage ongoing projects and expertise—both in Haiti and across the world—to further strengthen the capacity of the Government of Haiti and the infrastructure community to ensure effective use of investments and a smooth continuation along the journey to self-reliance.

## APPENDIX A: HAITI'S PERFORMANCE ON THE JOURNEY TO SELF-RELIANCE



### HAITI

JOURNEY TO SELF-RELIANCE:  
FY 2019 COUNTRY ROADMAP



#### LEGEND



Haiti's Score  
0-1, least to most  
advanced globally



Other Low- and  
Middle- Income  
Countries' Scores



Average Score for  
Low- and Middle-  
Income Countries

### COMMITMENT

#### OPEN AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE



#### INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT




#### ECONOMIC POLICY



All source data is for the latest year available, typically 2017 or 2016, and is derived from third-party institutions. All indicators are weighted equally in the calculation of the overall Commitment and Capacity scores. Names and boundary representation in the map are not necessarily authoritative.

For more information on definitions and sources, please visit [selfreliance.usaid.gov](http://selfreliance.usaid.gov).

#### LOW- & MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRY SNAPSHOT



### CAPACITY

#### GOVERNMENT CAPACITY




#### CIVIL SOCIETY CAPACITY



#### CITIZEN CAPACITY



#### CAPACITY OF THE ECONOMY





# SELF-RELIANCE ROADMAPS

## INDICATOR DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES

### COMMITMENT

#### OPEN AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE

**Liberal Democracy:** Measures freedom of expression, freedom of association, suffrage, elections, rule of law, judicial constraints on the executive branch, and legislative constraints on the executive branch. Source: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem).

**Open Government:** Measures the degree to which a government shares information, empowers people with tools to hold the government accountable, and fosters citizen participation in public policy deliberations. Sub-factors include: publicized laws and government data, right to information, civic participation, and complaint mechanisms. Source: World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index.

#### INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT

**Social Group Equality:** Measures political equality across social groups as defined by ethnicity, religion, caste, race, language, and region. Source: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), Social Group Equality in Respect to Civil Liberties.

**Economic Gender Gap:** Index comprising five components: (1) wage equality between women and men for similar work; (2) the ratio of female estimated earned income to male income; (3) the ratio of female labor force participation to male participation; (4) the ratio of female legislators, senior officials, and managers to male counterparts; and (5) the ratio of female professional and technical workers to male counterparts. Source: World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report, Economic Participation and Opportunity Sub-Index.

#### ECONOMIC POLICY

**Business Environment:** Assesses a country's entrepreneurial climate by measuring business' access to infrastructure (such as the internet and transport, and to credit), business flexibility (the costs of starting business and of hiring and firing), clear and fair regulations (e.g., intellectual property rights), and perceptions of meritocracy and opportunity. Source: Legatum Institute, Prosperity Index.

**Trade Freedom:** Measures a country's openness to international trade based on average tariff rates and non-tariff barriers to trade. Source: Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom.

**Biodiversity & Habitat Protections:** Measures extent of marine protected areas, terrestrial biome protection (weighted for both national and global scarcity), representativeness of protected areas, and whether protected areas cover the ranges and habitats of critical species. Source: Yale University/Columbia University Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN).

### CAPACITY

#### GOVERNMENT CAPACITY

**Government Effectiveness:** Measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and its independence from political pressure, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to its stated policies. Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators.

**Efficiency of Tax Administration:** Measures the efficiency of tax collection in relation to corporate taxes, household income taxes, national geographic consistency and reach, and the government's ability to limit tax evasion. Source: Institutional Profiles Database.

**Safety & Security:** A combination of objective measures of security, and subjective measures of personal safety, personal freedom, and social tolerance. Source: Legatum Institute, Prosperity Index.

#### CIVIL SOCIETY CAPACITY

**Civil Society & Media Effectiveness:** Measures the range of actions and mechanisms that citizens, civil society organizations, and an independent media can use to hold a government accountable. The mechanisms include using informal tools such as social mobilization and investigative journalism. Source: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), Diagonal Accountability Index.

#### CITIZEN CAPACITY

**Poverty Rate (\$5/Day):** Measures the percent of the population living under \$5/day in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. Source: World Bank, PovCalNet.

**Education Quality:** Measures the percentage of students attaining a minimum proficiency in reading toward the end of primary school, providing a comparative evaluation of the relative performance of educational systems across countries. Source: World Bank.

**Child Health:** A composite measure that aggregates under-5 child mortality, access to improved water sources, and access to improved sanitation facilities. Source: Columbia University Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN).

#### CAPACITY OF THE ECONOMY

**GDP Per Capita (PPP):** Measures the flow of resources available to households, firms, and government to finance development as the country's total Gross Domestic Product (PPP) divided by the country's population. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.

**Information & Communication Technology (ICT) Use:** Index comprising: (1) internet users as percent of population; (2) fixed-broadband internet subscriptions per 100 population; (3) internet bandwidth kb/s/user; (4) mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 population; (5) mobile telephone subscriptions per 100 population; and (6) fixed telephone lines per 100 population. Source: World Economic Forum (WEF), Global Competitiveness Index.

**Export Diversification:** Measures the diversification of a country's export products, one marker that can help gauge economic sophistication and resilience. Source: UNCTAD, Export Concentration Index.

APPENDIX B: FRAMEWORK CONNECTION TO USAID’S JOURNEY TO SELF-RELIANCE

This table outlines the connections between the WI-HER assessment framework and USAID’s Journey to Self-Reliance. The X marks note to which USAID commitment and capacity metric(s) each WI-HER indicator relates or corresponds.

WI-HER Assessment Indicator		Scoring		Connections to USAID’s Journey to Self-Reliance							
				Commitment				Capacity			
				Open Government	Social Equality	Economic Gender Gap	Business Environment	Bio Diversity	Government Effectiveness	Safety and Security	Civil Society Capacity
Performance											
Quality Results											
Projects come in on time	0– Never										
	1– Hardly ever							X			
	2– Sometimes										
Projects come in on budget	3– Always										
	0– Never										
	1– Hardly ever										
	2– Sometimes							X			
	3– Always										
	0– Never										
Meeting quality standards	1– Hardly ever										
	2– Sometimes							X			
	3– Always										
Sustainably Resourced											

Making a profit	0– Never									
	1– Hardly ever							X		
	2– Sometimes									
	3– Always									
Revenue generation (bringing in new business)	0– Never									
	1– Hardly ever									
	2– Sometimes							X		
	3– Always									

## Operational Capacity

Sound Financial Management										
Financial systems in place	0– No financial systems									
	1– Very low quality and/or limited systems									
	2– Some systems									
	3– Strong systems									
Transparent processes	0– Processes are hidden									
	1– Processes are difficult to understand									
	2 – Some processes are clear									
	3–Processes are purposely clear and consistent									
Fraud Barriers (2-party approval)	0– There are some problems or suspected incidences of fraud									
	1– Very low or limited									
	2– Some protections in place									
	3– Strong protections									

Effective Forecasting Processes	0— No understanding of how to forecast								
	1— Some understanding but no systems								
	2— Some processes to forecast and track								
	3— Institutionalized system and processes								
Competent Human Resources									
Clear roles and responsibilities (JDs)	0— I have (employees have) not seen my JD								
	1— JDs are unclear								
	2— JDs exist but do not match responsibilities and tasks			X	X				
	3— JDs exist, have been read, and match employee tasks and responsibilities								
Performance Standards and Monitoring	0— No performance standards								
	1— Exist but are not described (or not clearly)			X	X				
	2— Described but not tracked								
	3— Described and tracked								
On-going Training	0— No training available								
	1— Training available but not required								
	2— Training required but not useful			X	X				
	3— Training required and applicable								
Meritocracy	0— Hiring and promotion is unfair								
	1— Hiring and promotion is not tied to skill or performance								
	2— Sometimes hiring and promotion is tied to skill/ competence or performance		X	X	X				
	3— A clear link between competence and performance and opportunity								

Hiring and Retention Strategies	0— No strategies exist to link needs to personnel 1— Processes exist but are not standardized 2— Hiring strategies exist but no career path 3—Company has clear hiring strategies, related to need, and internal career paths		X	X	X					
Effective Organizational Management										
Goal Setting and Strategic Plans	0— No goal setting or strategies; 1— Informal goal setting but no clear strategy to reach goal; 2— Goals and strategy set but not effective; 3— Clear goal setting and implementable strategies				X					
Tracking Progress	0— Progress toward goals is not tracked or monitored 1— Indicators for measuring progress but no standard process for monitoring 2— Tracking is inconsistent 3— A standardized system is in place to track progress toward goals				X					
Quality Improvement (QI) Processes	0— No QI process exists 1— Sometimes we discuss ways to improve our work 2— Some teams or individuals carry out a QI process 3— Company has institutionalized and standardized QI process in place				X					

Mechanisms for feedback between Infrastructure Community and Government / constituency	0— Companies have no formalized mechanisms to get feedback from others (government or constituency)								
	1— Mechanisms exist, but are not standardized or consistent								
	2— Mechanisms exist and are useful to receive feedback from both government and community constituency	X						X	X
	3— Mechanisms exist to receive and act upon feedback from both government and community constituency								

Technical Capacity

Supportive Processes / Practices									
Easy access to necessary materials	0— Never								
	1— Hardly ever								
	2— Sometimes				X				
	3— Always								
Steady and affordable energy supply	0— Never								
	1— Hardly ever								
	2— Sometimes				X				
	3— Always								
Have process for delivery in place (logistics, supply chain, tracking)	0— Never								
	1— Hardly ever								
	2— Sometimes				X				
	3— Always								

There are procurement processes	0– Never								
	1– Hardly ever					X			
	2– Sometimes								
	3– Always								
Technologies and operating systems exist	0– Never								
	1– Hardly ever								
	2– Sometimes					X			
	3– Always								

Culture and Commitment to Reform

Culture									
Accountability structures enforcing compliance to safety regulations and company policies	0– There are no company rules or policies that govern employee behavior								
	1– There are rules for some behaviors but not consistent					X			
	2– There are rules but not enforced						X	X	X
	3– There are policies for both employee behavior and regulatory compliance, and they are enforced								
Anti-Corruption efforts	0– There are no mechanisms to guard against corruption								
	1– Mechanisms exist but are ineffective in preventing corruption					X		X	
	2– Mechanisms in place but are not applied inconsistently								
	3– Mechanisms in place, enforced, and effective								X

Respectful and safe workplace enforcement	0– Workplace is disrespectful and/or unsafe 1– There are no rules against disrespectful language or aggressive behavior 2– There are rules, but they are not enforced 3– There are enforced rules against disrespectful language and/or aggressive behavior		X	X					X	
Equitable treatment	0– No one feels valued 1– Certain groups feel valued 2– Most groups feel valued 3– The culture in the company aims to value everybody equally		X	X					X	
Work Ethic										
Entrepreneurial values	0– Employees and managers are not committed to work 1– Only a few work hard 2– Most work to advance the company 3– There is a culture of work across the management and staff to advance the company					X				
Compliance	0– Managers and staff do not care about compliance to regulations and policies 1– Some are conscientious of compliance 2– Most are conscientious 3– All are conscientious					X				
Learning and Collaboration										



	0– No mechanisms for feedback and cooperation exist 1– Some mechanisms exist but not standardized 2– Standardized mechanisms exist but not consistently used 3– There are standardized mechanisms and institutionalized processes that are implemented		X					X	X
Responsive to community constituency									
Collaboration and responsiveness among infrastructure community (to exchange challenges, concerns, lessons learned, training, and technologies)	0– No collaboration among the organizations/ companies in the infrastructure community 1– Some collaboration among companies, but led by external partners 2– Some collaboration among infrastructure community, but not formalized 3– Mechanisms exist to collaborate and help each other develop					X	X		X
Quality assurance / Quality improvement among the infrastructure community (to improve safety, quality, standard work practices)	0– No QI processes across the sector 1– Some weak efforts toward QI in the sector 2– Limited QI activities 3– Institutionalized process for QI across the sector					X	X	X	X

### Supportive External Environment

Country Policies and Practices that Promote Resilience									
	0– No business-friendly policies 1– Some policies but not effective 2– Policies are in place that are helping create an atmosphere to improve companies' work 3– Government promotes and implements business-friendly policies								
Policies that promote business						X		X	

Policies that ensure equity	0– No policies in place that require equal treatment of women, men, and minorities 1– Policies exist but are not published, posted, or clear 2– Posted policies exist but are not enforced 3– Clear policies are posted and enforced				X	X	X	X		
Process for risk mitigation and grievance redress	0– No mechanism for bringing concerns to the attention of authorities 1– Mechanisms exist in theory but are not implemented 2– Mechanisms are not effective 3– There are effective mechanisms and processes in place				X		X		X	X
Regulations that promote disaster risk reduction (DRR)	0– No regulations exist 1– Exist but not implemented; 2– Implemented but not enforced 3– Implemented and enforced							X		X
Environmental impact policy	0– No policies exist 1– Exist but not implemented; 2– Implemented but not enforced 3– Implemented and enforced							X		X
Labor laws	0– No laws exist 1– Exist but not implemented 2– Implemented but not enforced 3– Implemented and enforced				X	X	X		X	X

Country Systems that Support Implementation									
Building code guides implementation of policy (clear and understandable)	0— Building code is not complete								
	1— Building code exists but needs improvement or updating								
	2— Building code is complete and clear but not enforced	X					X		
	3— Building code is complete, clear, implemented nationally, and enforced								
Infrastructure exists to support business development (energy sources, technologies, accessible credit)	0— Not at all								
	1— Somewhat								
	2— Usually	X					X		
	3— Definitely yes								
Local Regulatory processes are smooth (no bottlenecks)	0— Not at all								
	1— Somewhat								
	2— Usually					X		X	
	3— Definitely yes								
Compliance to regulations and requirements are affordable (application process fees, building permits, etc.)	0— Not at all								
	1— Somewhat								
	2— Usually					X		X	
	3— Definitely yes								
Enforcement									
There are regular inspections	0— Never								
	1— Hardly ever								
	2— Sometimes								
	3— Always								

Compliance is mandatory	0– Never 1– Hardly ever 2– Sometimes 3– Always								
Professional associations support infrastructure community to comply	0– Never 1– Hardly ever 2– Sometimes 3– Always								
<b>Advocacy</b>									
Institutionalized mechanisms for infrastructure community to communicate with government bodies	0– There is no way to have my grievances heard 1– There are mechanisms in place, but they are ineffective 2– Sometimes the government will have hearings 3– There is an effective, institutionalized system for addressing grievances	X							
Institutionalized mechanisms for dialogue between infrastructure community and local community constituency	0– Nothing like this exists 1– Sometimes meetings are held but no formalized mechanisms 2– Formalized mechanisms but no one participates 3– Formalized mechanisms that are effective		X						X
Institutionalized mechanisms for dialogue between local manufacturing community and external partners (implementers)	0– Nothing like this exists 1– Sometimes meetings are held but inconsistently 2– Formalized mechanisms exist but they are not effective 3– Formalized mechanisms exist, and they are helpful				X				X

## APPENDIX C: LIST OF RESOURCES FOR FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT

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## APPENDIX D: DATA COLLECTION TOOLS

### Contractor Written Survey

**Instructions:** For each statement in the left column, please write the number of the score representing your answer in the right column. Please write only one score for each statement. The scoring system will vary for each statement, so please review the scores for each statement.

Performance		
<b>Quality Results.</b>		<b>Score</b>
In general, do architecture, engineering, and construction projects in Haiti...		
1. Come in on time?	0– Never 1– Hardly ever 2– Sometimes 3– Always	
2. Come in on budget?	0– Never 1– Hardly ever 2– Sometimes 3– Always	
3. Meet quality standards?	0– Never 1– Hardly ever 2– Sometimes 3– Always	
<b>Sustainably Resourced</b>		<b>Score</b>
In general, are architecture, engineering, and construction firms in Haiti able to...		
4. Make a profit?	0– Never 1– Hardly ever 2– Sometimes 3– Always	
5. Generate revenue (bring in new business)?	0– Never 1– Hardly ever 2– Sometimes	

	3– Always	
<b>Operational Capacity</b>		
<b>Sound Financial Management</b>		<b>Score</b>
In general, do architecture, engineering, and construction firms in Haiti have...		
6. Financial management systems in place?	0– No financial systems 1– Very low quality and/or limited systems 2– Some systems 3– Strong systems	
7. Transparent processes?	0– Processes are hidden 1– Processes are difficult to understand 2 – Some processes are clear 3– Processes are purposely clear and consistent	
8. Fraud Barriers (2-party approval)?	0– There are some problems or suspected incidences of fraud 1– Very low or limited 2– Some protections in place 3– Strong protections	
9. Budgeting processes?	0– No understanding of how to forecast 1– Some understanding but no systems 2– Some processes to forecast and track 3– Institutionalized system and processes	
<b>Competent Human Resources</b>		<b>Score</b>
In general, do architecture, engineering, and construction firms in Haiti have in place...		
10. Clear roles and responsibilities (JDs)?	0– I have (employees have) not seen my JD 1– JDs are unclear 2– JDs exist but do not match responsibilities and tasks 3– JDs exist, have been read, and match employee tasks and responsibilities	
11. Performance Standards and monitoring?	0– No performance standards exist 1– Exist but are not described (or not clearly)	

	2– Described but not tracked 3– Described and tracked	
12. On-going training opportunities?	0– No training available 1– Training available but not required 2– Training required but not applicable to the job, poor quality, or inconsistently provided 3– Training required and applicable	
13. Fair promotion and hiring practices (meritocracy)?	0– Hiring and promotion is unfair 1– Hiring and promotion is not tied to skill or performance 2– Sometimes hiring and promotion is tied to skill/ competence or performance 3– There is a clear link between competence and performance and opportunity	
14. Hiring and retention strategies?	0– No strategies exist to link needs to personnel 1– Processes exist but are not standardized 2– Hiring strategies exist but no career path 3– Company has clear hiring strategies, related to need, and internal career paths	
<b>Effective Organizational Management</b>		<b>Score</b>
In general, do architecture, engineering, and construction firms in Haiti have in place...		
15. Goal setting and strategic plans?	0– No goal setting or strategies takes place 1– Informal goal setting takes place but there is no clear strategy to reach goal 2– Goals and strategy set but not effective 3– Clear goal setting and implementable strategies	
16. Processes for tracking progress?	0– Progress toward goals is not tracked or monitored 1– Indicators for measuring progress but no standard process for monitoring 2– Tracking is inconsistent 3– A standardized system is in place to track progress	



	toward goals	
17. Quality Assurance (QA) processes?	0– No QA process exists 1– Sometimes we discuss ways to improve our work 2– Some teams or individuals carry out a QA process 3– Company has institutionalized and standardized QA process in place	
18. Mechanisms for feedback between Infrastructure Community and Government/ constituency (neighborhoods, beneficiaries, end-users)?	0– Companies have no formalized mechanisms to get feedback from others (government or constituency) 1– Mechanisms exist, but are not standardized or consistent 2– Mechanisms exist and are useful to receive feedback from both government and community constituency 3– Mechanisms exist to receive and act upon feedback from both government and community constituency	
<b>Technical Capacity</b>		
<b>Supportive Processes / Practices</b>		<b>Score</b>
In general, do architecture, engineering, and construction firms in Haiti have...		
19. Easy access to necessary materials?	0– Never 1– Hardly ever 2– Sometimes 3– Always	
20. Steady and affordable energy supply?	0– Never 1– Hardly ever 2– Sometimes 3– Always	
21. Processes for delivery in place (logistics, supply chain, tracking)?	0– Never 1– Hardly ever 2– Sometimes 3– Always	

22. Procurement processes?	0– Never 1– Hardly ever 2– Sometimes 3– Always	
23. Technologies and information management systems?	0– Never 1– Hardly ever 2– Sometimes 3– Always	
<b>Culture and Commitment to Reform</b>		
<b>Culture</b>		<b>Score</b>
In general, do architecture, engineering, and construction firms in Haiti have...		
24. Accountability structures enforcing compliance to safety regulations and company policies?  <i>(Accountability means there are expectations for regulatory compliance and consequences if they are not followed)</i>	0– There are no company rules or policies that govern employee behavior 1– There are rules for some behaviors but not consistent 2– There are rules but not enforced 3– There are policies for both employee behavior and regulatory compliance, and they are enforced	
25. Anti-Corruption efforts?	0– There are no mechanisms to guard against corruption 1– Mechanisms exist but are ineffective in preventing corruption 2– Mechanisms in place but are not applied consistently 3– Mechanisms in place, enforced, and effective	
26. Respectful and safe work environments (against harassment or aggressive behavior)?	0– Workplace is disrespectful and/or unsafe 1– There are no rules against disrespectful language or aggressive behavior 2– There are rules, but they are not enforced 3– There are enforced rules against disrespectful language and/or aggressive behavior	
27. Equitable treatment between men and	0– No one feels valued	

women?	1– Certain groups feel valued 2– Most groups feel valued 3–The culture in the company aims to value everybody equally	
<b>Work Ethic</b>		<b>Score</b>
In general, do people in Haiti have...		
28. Entrepreneurial values?	0– Employees and managers are not committed to work 1– Only a few work hard 2– Most work to advance the company 3– There is a culture of work across the management and staff to advance the company	
29. A commitment to compliance?	0– Managers and staff do not care about compliance to regulations and policies 1– Some are conscientious of compliance 2– Most are conscientious 3– All are conscientious	
<b>Learning and Collaboration</b>		<b>Score</b>
30. Are companies responsive to community constituency (beneficiaries, neighborhoods, end-users)?	0– No mechanisms for feedback and cooperation exist 1– Some mechanisms exist but not standardized 2– Standardized mechanisms exist but not consistently used 3– There are standardized mechanisms and institutionalized processes that are implemented	
31. Is there collaboration and responsiveness among infrastructure community (to exchange challenges, concerns, lessons learned, training, and technologies)?	0– No collaboration among the organizations/ companies in the infrastructure community 1– Some collaboration among companies, but led by external partners 2– Some collaboration among infrastructure community, but not formalized	

	3– Mechanisms exist to collaborate and help each other develop	
<b>Supportive External Environment</b>		
<b>Country Policies and Practices that Promote Resilience</b>		<b>Score</b>
In Haiti, are there...		
32. Policies that promote business?	0– No business-friendly policies 1– Some policies but not effective 2– Policies are in place that are helping create an atmosphere to improve companies' work 3– Government promotes and implements business-friendly policies	
34. Policies that ensure equity?	0– No policies in place that require equal treatment of women, men, and minorities 1– Policies exist but are not published, posted, or clear 2– Posted policies exist but are not enforced 3– Clear policies are posted and enforced	
35. Processes for risk mitigation and grievance redress?	0– No mechanism for bringing concerns to the attention of authorities 1– Mechanisms exist in theory but are not implemented 2– Mechanisms are not effective 3– There are effective mechanisms and processes in place	
36. Regulations that promote disaster risk reduction (DRR)?	0– No regulations exist 1– Exist but not implemented 2– Implemented but not enforced 3– Implemented and enforced	
37. Environmental impact policies?	0– No policies exist 1– Exist but not implemented; 2– Implemented but not enforced	

	3– Implemented and enforced	
38. Labor laws?	0– No laws exist 1– Exist but not implemented 2– Implemented but not enforced 3– Implemented and enforced	
<b>Country Systems that Support Implementation</b>		<b>Score</b>
In Haiti, are/is...		
39. Building codes clear and understandable?	0– Building code is not complete 1– Building code exists but needs improvement or updating 2– Building code is complete and clear but not enforced 3– Building code is complete, clear, implemented nationally, and enforced	
40. Infrastructure in place to support business development (energy sources, technologies, accessible credit)?	0– Not at all 1– Somewhat 2– Usually 3– Definitely yes	
41. Local regulatory processes smooth (no bottlenecks)?	0– Not at all 1– Somewhat 2– Usually 3– Definitely yes	
42. Compliance to regulations and requirements affordable (application process fees, building permits, etc.)?	0– Not at all 1– Somewhat 2– Usually 3– Definitely yes	
<b>Enforcement</b>		<b>Score</b>
43. Are there regular inspections?	0– Never 1– Hardly ever 2– Sometimes	

	3– Always	
44. Is compliance mandatory?	0– Never 1– Hardly ever 2– Sometimes 3– Always	
45. Are there professional associations to support the infrastructure community to comply?	0– Never 1– Hardly ever 2– Sometimes 3– Always	
<b>Advocacy</b>		<b>Score</b>
Are there...		
46. Institutionalized mechanisms for infrastructure community to communicate with government bodies?	0– There is no way to have my grievances heard 1– There are mechanisms in place, but they are ineffective 2– Sometimes the government will have hearings 3– There is an effective, institutionalized system for addressing grievances	
47. Institutionalized mechanisms for dialogue between infrastructure community and local community constituency?	0– Nothing like this exists 1– Sometimes meetings are held but no formalized mechanisms 2– Formalized mechanisms but no one participates 3– Formalized mechanisms that are effective	
48. Institutionalized mechanisms for dialogue between local manufacturing community and external partners (implementers)?	0– Nothing like this exists 1– Sometimes meetings are held but inconsistently 2– Formalized mechanisms exist but they are not effective 3– Formalized mechanisms exist, and they are helpful	

### Student Questionnaire (only available in French)

**Instructions:** Pour chaque énoncé dans la colonne de gauche, veuillez inscrire le numéro de la note représentant votre réponse dans la colonne de droite. Veuillez n'inscrire qu'une seule note pour chaque énoncé. Le système de notation variera pour chaque énoncé ; veuillez donc examiner les notes pour chaque énoncé.

Performance		
Qualités des Résultats		Pts
1. Selon ce que vous savez ou entendez, les projets arrivent-ils à temps ?	0– Jamais 1– Presque jamais 2– Parfois 3– Toujours	
2. Selon ce que vous savez ou entendez, les projets respectent-ils le budget?	0– Jamais 1– Presque jamais 2– Parfois 3– Toujours	
3. Selon ce que vous savez ou entendez, les projets, respect-ils des normes de qualité ?	0– Jamais 1– Presque jamais 2– Parfois 3– Toujours	
Pérennité des Ressources		Pts
4. Selon ce que vous savez ou entendez, les entreprises locales réalisent-elles un profit?	0– Jamais 1– Presque jamais 2– Parfois 3– Toujours	
Capacité Opérationnelle		
Ressources Humaines Compétentes		Pts
5. D'après votre expérience (ou d'après ce que vous entendez), les postes au sein des organisations locales comportent-ils des descriptions de poste avec des rôles et des responsabilités clairement	0- Je n'ai pas vu mon JD (les employés l'ont vu). 1- Les JD ne sont pas clairs. 2- Les JD existent mais ne correspondent pas aux responsabilités et aux tâches.	

définis?	3- Les JD existent, ont été lus et correspondent aux tâches des employés.	
6. Selon vous, les entreprises soutiennent-elles la formation continue pour l'actualisation des connaissances?	0- Aucune formation disponible 1- Formation disponible mais non obligatoire 2- Formation requise mais non applicable à l'emploi, de mauvaise qualité ou fournie de façon incohérente 3- Formation requise et applicable	
<b>Gestion Organisationnelle Efficace</b>		<b>Pts</b>
7. Selon ce que vous savez ou entendez, existe-t-il des mécanismes de rétroaction (feedback) entre la collectivité de l'infrastructure et le gouvernement ou la communauté?	0- Les entreprises n'ont pas de mécanismes officiels pour obtenir des renseignements concernant les autres parties (gouvernement ou groupe d'intérêt) 1- Il existe des mécanismes, mais ils ne sont pas normalisés ou cohérents. 2- Des mécanismes existent et sont utiles pour recevoir de la rétroaction de la part du gouvernement et de la population locale 3- Il existe des mécanismes pour recevoir les commentaires et y donner suite de la part du gouvernement et de la population locale	
<b>Capacités Techniques</b>		
<b>Processus de Soutien /Pratiques</b>		<b>Pts</b>
8. Selon ce que vous savez ou entendez, Y a-t-il un accès facile au matériel nécessaire?	0- Jamais 1- Presque jamais 2- Parfois 3- Toujours	
9. Selon ce que vous savez ou entendez, l'approvisionnement en énergie stable est-il abordable?	0- Jamais 1- Presque jamais 2- Parfois 3- Toujours	
10. Les entreprises haïtiennes ont-elles des technologies et systèmes d'exploitation?	0- Jamais	



	1- Presque jamais 2- Parfois 3- Toujours	
<b>Culture et Engagement envers la Réforme</b>		
<b>Culture</b>		<b>Pts</b>
11. Selon ce que vous savez ou entendez, Existe-t-il des règles de sécurité et sont-elles appliquées?	0- Il n'y a pas de règles ou de politiques de l'entreprise qui régissent le comportement des employés 1- Il y a des règles pour certains comportements, mais elles ne sont pas cohérentes. 2- Il y a des règles mais elles ne sont pas appliquées 3- Il y a des politiques concernant le comportement des employés et la conformité réglementaire, et elles sont appliquées	
12. Selon ce que vous savez ou entendez, y a-t-il la lutte contre la Corruption ?	0- Il n'existe aucun mécanisme de protection contre la corruption 1- Des mécanismes existent, mais sont inefficaces pour prévenir l'infection par la corruption 2- Mécanismes en place mais pas appliqués de façon cohérente 3- Mécanismes en place, appliqués et efficaces	
13. Selon ce que vous savez ou entendez, le traitement des employés est-il équitable dans la plupart des entreprises locales?	0- Personne ne se sent valorisé 1- Certains groupes se sentent valorisés 2- La plupart des groupes se sentent valorisés 3- La culture de l'entreprise vise à valoriser tout le monde de la même manière.	
<b>Environnement Externe de Support</b>		
<b>Politiques et Pratiques Nationales Favorisant la Résilience</b>		<b>Pts</b>
14. Selon ce que vous savez ou entendez, Existe-t-il des politiques favorables aux entreprises et encourageant la croissance?	0- Aucune politique favorable aux entreprises 1- Certaines politiques mais non efficaces 2- Des politiques sont établies et contribuent à la création d'une atmosphère pour améliorer le travail des entreprises 3- Le gouvernement promeut et met en œuvre des	

	politiques favorables aux entreprises	
15. Selon ce que vous savez ou entendez, Existe-t-il des politiques d'impact environnemental?	0- Aucune politique n'existe 1- Politique existante mais non mise en œuvre ; 2- Mise en œuvre mais non appliquée 3- Mise en œuvre et appliquée	
<b>Systèmes Nationaux d'Appui à la Mise en œuvre</b>		<b>Pts</b>
16. Selon ce que vous savez ou entendez, Existe-t-il des guides de construction et sont-ils clairs et compréhensibles?	0- Le code du bâtiment n'est pas complet 1- Le code du bâtiment existe mais a besoin d'être amélioré ou mise à jour 2- Le code du bâtiment est complet et clair mais non appliqué 3- Le code du bâtiment est complet, clair et appliqué à l'échelle nationale.	
<b>Application de la loi</b>		<b>Pts</b>
17. Selon ce que vous savez ou entendez, Existe-t-il des associations professionnelles qui encouragent la communauté des infrastructures à se conformer?	0- Jamais 1- Presque jamais 2- Parfois 3- Toujours	

**Government Survey (only available in French)**

<b>Résultats de Qualité</b>		<b>Pts</b>
1. Sur une échelle de zéro à trois, indiquez si les projets réalisés à temps.	0– Jamais 1– Presque jamais 2– Parfois 3– Toujours	
2. Sur une échelle de zéro à trois, indiquez si les projets répondent aux prévisions budgétaires.	0– Jamais 1– Presque jamais 2– Parfois 3– Toujours	
3. Sur une échelle de zéro à trois, indiquez si les projets répondent aux normes réglementaires (de qualité).	0– Jamais 1– Presque jamais 2– Parfois 3– Toujours	
<b>Ressources Durables</b>		<b>Pts</b>

4.	Sur une échelle de zéro à trois, indiquez si les entreprises génèrent profit.	0– Jamais 1– Presque jamais 2– Parfois 3– Toujours	
5.	Sur une échelle de zéro à trois, indiquez si les projets génèrent des revenus (création de nouvelles entreprises).	0– Jamais 1– Presque jamais 2– Parfois 3– Toujours	
<b>Gestion Financière Adéquate</b>			<b>Pts</b>
6.	Sur une échelle de zéro à trois, quelles sont selon vous les capacités financières des entreprises locales / ou du secteur ? Par exemple : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Systèmes Financiers en place.</li> <li>• Procédure Transparente.</li> <li>• Protections contre la fraude</li> <li>• Processus budgétaire</li> </ul>	0-très mauvais 1-mauvais 2-moyen 3-fort	
<b>Ressources Humaines Compétentes</b>			<b>Pts</b>
7.	Sur une échelle de zéro à trois, que pensez-vous de la capacité de gestion et de développement des ressources humaines dans les entreprises locales du secteur A&I ? Par exemple : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Postes et Responsabilités bien définis (Terme de Contrat)</li> <li>• Normes de performance et surveillance</li> <li>• Formation Continue</li> <li>• Méritocratie</li> <li>• Stratégies de Recrutement et d'embauche</li> </ul>	0-très mauvais 1-mauvais 2-moyen 3-fort	
<b>Gestion Organisationnelle Performante</b>			<b>Pts</b>
8.	Sur une échelle de zéro à trois, que pensez-vous de la capacité de gestion des entreprises locales dans ce secteur ? Par exemple : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Objectifs et plans stratégiques</li> <li>• Suivi des progrès</li> <li>• Processus d'assurance de la qualité</li> </ul>	0-très mauvais 1-mauvais 2-moyen 3-fort	
<b>Capacité Technique</b>			<b>Pts</b>
9.	Sur une échelle de zéro à trois, quel est selon vous le niveau de maturité des processus pratiques des entreprises ? Par exemple : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Accès rapide aux ressources nécessaires</li> <li>• Approvisionnement énergétique stable et abordable</li> <li>• Procédures de Livraison (Logistique, Gestion des approvisionnements, Suivi)</li> <li>• Procédure d'approvisionnement</li> <li>• Technologies et systèmes de gestion de l'information</li> </ul>	0-très mauvais 1-mauvais 2-moyen 3-fort	

Culture		Pts
<p>10. Sur une échelle de zéro à trois, dans quelle proportion estimez-vous que la culture des compagnies et des entreprises d'infrastructure favorise des pratiques entrepreneuriales rentables ? Par exemple :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mécanismes pour assurer la conformité aux Règlements éthiques et aux Politiques de l'entreprise.</li> <li>• Lutte contre la Corruption</li> <li>• Un environnement sûr et respectueux (contre le harcèlement ou les comportements agressifs)</li> <li>• Traitement Équitable entre les hommes et les femmes</li> </ul>	<p>0– Jamais 1– Presque jamais 2– Parfois 3– Toujours</p>	
Éthique de travail		Pts
<p>11. Sur une échelle de zéro à trois, pensez-vous que la structure des compagnies et des firmes d'infrastructures contribue à promouvoir des approches opérationnelles de qualité ? Par exemple :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Les Valeurs entrepreneuriales</li> <li>• Un engagement envers la conformité</li> </ul>	<p>0– Jamais 1– Presque jamais 2– Parfois 3– Toujours</p>	
Enseignement et Coopération		Pts
<p>12. Sur une échelle de zéro à trois, pensez-vous que les compagnies et des entreprises d'infrastructures encouragent des pratiques entrepreneuriales judicieuses ? Par exemple :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Répondre aux besoins des communautés cibles.</li> <li>• Collaboration et réceptivité au sein de la collectivité de l'infrastructure (pour échanger des défis, des préoccupations, des leçons apprises, de la formation et des technologies)</li> </ul>	<p>0– Jamais 1– Presque jamais 2– Parfois 3– Toujours</p>	
Politiques et Pratiques Nationales Favorisant la Résilience		Pts
<p>13. Sur une échelle de zéro à trois, direz-vous des politiques nationales qu'ils encouragent le succès des compagnies et entreprises du secteur de l'infrastructure ? Par exemple :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Politiques favorisant les Affaires</li> <li>• Des règles qui assurent la transparence et l'équité</li> <li>• Mécanisme de réduction des risques et des doléances</li> <li>• Politique de réduction des risques et désastres</li> <li>• Politiques qui protègent l'environnement</li> <li>• Lois du Travail</li> </ul>	<p>0– Jamais 1– Presque jamais 2– Parfois 3– Toujours</p>	
Systèmes Nationaux Responsable de la Mise en œuvre		Pts
<p>14. Sur une échelle de zéro à trois, dans quelle mesure diriez-vous que les systèmes nationaux facilitent ou aident les entreprises d'infrastructure à faire avancer leurs projets ? Par exemple :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Code du bâtiment clair et compréhensible</li> </ul>	<p>0– Jamais 1– Presque jamais 2– Parfois 3– Toujours</p>	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Infrastructures soutenant le développement des Entreprises (sources d'énergie, technologies, crédit accessible)</li> <li>• Processus de réglementations locaux équilibrés (pas de goulots d'étranglement)</li> <li>• Caractère abordable du respect des réglementations et des exigences (frais de processus de demande, permis de construire, etc.)</li> </ul>		
<b>Renforcement / Mise en Vigueur</b>		<b>Pts</b>
15. Sur une échelle de zéro à trois, dans quelle mesure les efforts nationaux renforcent-ils la qualité et la sécurité ? Par exemple : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inspections Régulières</li> <li>• Conformités Obligatoires</li> <li>• Soutien d'Associations professionnelles pour les conformités</li> </ul>	0– Jamais 1– Presque jamais 2– Parfois 3– Toujours	

### Implementing Partner Survey

**Instructions:** For each statement in the left column, please write the number of the score representing your answer in the right column—stating whether you strongly agree (3), agree (2), disagree (1), or strongly disagree (0). Please write only one score for each statement.

Statement	Scoring System	Score
1. Competent local organizations across the sectors of the infrastructure community are available.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
2. Local partners have capacity to deliver quality services and make a profit	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
3. Your organization is strong in engaging local organization for collaboration and building local capacity.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
4. USAID assists your organization to link with diverse partners to reach project goals.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
5. USAID understands the challenges in collaborating with local organizations.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
<b>Approaches to Partnering and Procurement / Effective Co-Creation and Collaboration</b>	<b>Scoring System</b>	<b>Score</b>
6. Expectations of USAID match your proposed deliverables.	3 – Strongly agree	

	2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
7. USAID is open and willing to collaborate on solutions to challenges.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
8. Creativity and learning are encouraged by USAID over a prescriptive approach.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
9. Your organization's is strong in innovation and creativity.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
10. Your organization is strong in overcoming obstacles to engaging government in collaboration.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
11. Your organization is strong in overcoming obstacles to engaging USAID in collaboration.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
<b>Linking Design to Implementation</b>	<b>Scoring System</b>	<b>Score</b>
12. Your organization adapts program design to respond to baseline findings and benchmark assessments.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
13. USAID supports and is willing to adapt programmatic objectives and	3 – Strongly agree	

milestones based on ongoing assessment evidence.	2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
14. USAID has realistic expectations in time required to implement.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
15. Your organization is strong in implementation efficiency.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
16. USAID expectations of cost and programmatic requirements are realistic.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
17. Your organization budgets accurately.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
<b>Adaptive Management</b>	<b>Scoring System</b>	<b>Score</b>
18. Your organization demonstrates adaptive management.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
19. USAID responds to unexpected changes or is willing to shift and pivot.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	




Better Use of Data	Scoring System	Score
20. Your organization documents and monitors data well.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
21. Your organization applies data for decision-making.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
22. Your organization guides and advises USAID on new information, decisions needed, or recommendations based on findings.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
23. USAID has reasonable requirements for reporting.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
24. USAID communicates clearly on their needs and concerns.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
Project Management	Scoring System	Score
25. Your organization has strong project management skills.	3 – Strongly agree 2 1 0 – Strongly disagree	
26. USAID has a streamlined process to decrease bureaucracy.	3 – Strongly agree 2	

	1	
	0 – Strongly disagree	
<b>Final Questions</b>		
<p>1. What are your strongest and weakest areas in program management?</p> <p>2. What are the biggest challenges you face in successfully implementing your project in Haiti? What are some opportunities and assets that you see?</p> <p>3. How can USAID best help you navigate the challenges in Haiti projects?</p> <p>4. Any other comments?</p>		

## APPENDIX E: PRESENTATION

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# Haiti Architecture and Engineering Community Assessment

Haiti Infrastructure Program

AECOM and WI-HER

June 2019

# Outline

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- Objectives
- Rationale
- Assessment Framework
- Methodology
- Findings (Quantitative and Qualitative)
- Opportunities and Recommendations




# Objectives of the assessment

Specifically related to the Haiti architecture, engineering, and construction sectors:

- Identify the challenges to self-reliance and sustainability
- Articulate enabling and constricting factors to resilience and autonomy
- Recommend evidence-based interventions or approaches
- Suggest indicators that will demonstrate tangible improvements





# Rationale


Understand the challenges, opportunities, gaps, and successes in the infrastructure sector in Haiti to more strategically invest funds and more effectively build self-reliance and ensure sustainability.

# Assessment framework



## Supportive external environment

- Policies and Practices that Promote Resilience
- Systems that support implementation
- Enforcement
- Advocacy




## Culture and commitment to reform

- Culture
- Work ethic
- Learning and collaboration



## Technical capacity

- Supportive processes/practices



## Operational capacity

- Sound financial management
- Competent human resources
- Effective organizational management



## Sector Performance

- Quality results
- Sustainably resourced



# METHODOLOGY

# Mixed Method

- **Desk review:**  
Literature on Haiti infrastructure
- **10 day rapid assessment:**  
Port-au-Prince and Cap-Hatien
- **A mixed methods approach:**  
qualitative and quantitative data



# Respondent groups

Location	Group	Organization or agency	Total #
<b>Port-au-Prince</b>	Government	FEDMAH, UCLBP, MTPTC, P.V. Town Hall Engineering Department, UTE	6
	Implementing partners	AECOM, WOCCU, IOM, GHSC-PSM, Papyrus	6
	Contractors	Various individuals and companies (local and international)	11
	Students	Université Ruben Leconte and Université Américaine des Sciences Modernes d'Haïti	24
	Constituents	Faith based organization	2
	Other	USAID	1
<b>Cap-Haïtien</b>	Government	Organisation de Gestion de la Destination Nord Haïti, Chambre de Commerce du Nord	2
	Implementing partners	DAI	2
	Contractors	Various individuals and companies (local and international)	3
	Students	Université Roi Henri Christophe	5
	Constituents	Faith based organization (1), Water Users Association (local farmers) (4)	5

# QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS


# Quantitative: Illustrative survey questions

Thematic Areas	Illustrative Survey Question	Scoring
Supportive External Environment	In Haiti, are the building codes clear and understandable?	0– Building code is not complete 1– Building code exists but needs improvement or updating 2– Building code is complete and clear but not enforced 3– Building code is complete, clear, implemented nationally, and enforced
Culture and Commitment to Reform	In general, do architecture, engineering, and construction firms in Haiti have anti-corruption efforts?	0– There are no mechanisms to guard against corruption 1– Mechanisms exist but are ineffective in preventing corruption 2– Mechanisms in place but are not applied consistently 3– Mechanisms in place, enforced, and effective
Technical Capacity	In general, do architecture, engineering, and construction firms in Haiti have processes for delivery in place (logistics, supply chain, tracking)?	0– Never 1– Hardly ever 2– Sometimes 3– Always

# Quantitative: Illustrative survey questions (cont'd)

Thematic Areas	Illustrative Survey Question	Scoring
Operational Capacity	In general, do architecture, engineering, and construction firms in Haiti have financial management systems in place?	0– No financial systems 1– Very low quality and/or limited systems 2– Some systems 3– Strong systems
Sector Performance	In general, do architecture, engineering, and construction projects in Haiti come in on time? On budget?	0– Never 1– Hardly ever 2– Sometimes 3– Always

# Quantitative findings (Scores 0-3)



# Implementing partner (IP) self-reported survey results

## Identified strengths

- IPs engage local organizations.
- IPs are innovative and creative.
- IPs engage USAID in collaboration.
- IPs are adaptive and responsive.
- IPs have strong management skills.

## Identified challenges

- Local partners do not have capacity to deliver quality services and make a profit.
- USAID needs streamlined process and less bureaucracy.
- USAID needs realistic expectations regarding time required to implement.



# QUALITATIVE FINDINGS

# Qualitative findings: strengths of the sector and opportunities for improvement

- Good working relationship between implementing partners and local organizations.
- Strong coordination between USAID and government counterparts.
- A new generation of trained engineers and architects that are optimistic about future work.
- USAID has an increased focus on sustainability, self-reliance, and capacity building.
- USAID is collaborative and flexible with the IPs within a shifting and challenging context.



# Select quotes

- “Haiti needs to go beyond charity to investment and partnerships. We are not there yet but we will be. Haiti needs to come a land of opportunity. People need to know that the funding will not go on forever.” - Government official
- “Our future is related to the future of the country. We must create the possibilities. We are very excited about this sector and love this work, we believe that there will be more opportunities for us in the future.” – Student
- “Haiti has to build our country on our own, but we need your support to get there.” –Contractor

# OPPORTUNITIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

# Details of challenges with recommendations

Measurement Areas	Findings: Challenges, Needs and Opportunities	Recommendations
Supportive External Environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government instability</li> <li>• Lack of institutional norms</li> <li>• Corruption</li> <li>• Unclear/weak policies</li> <li>• Unclear land titles</li> <li>• Ineffective labor laws</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Build capacity of government in quality assurance and oversight</li> <li>• Build government capacity to eliminate corruption</li> <li>• Improve land titling system</li> <li>• Work with the government to improve oversight and reduce fraud</li> <li>• Work with the government on visioning and strategic planning</li> </ul>
Culture and Commitment to Reform	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No support systems for local infrastructure companies and contractors (no associations or opportunities for training)</li> <li>• Lack of coordination between organizations</li> <li>• Insufficient engagement of construction community with beneficiary community</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reinforce/build the capacity of the professional associations.</li> <li>• USAID facilitate coordination.</li> </ul>

# Details of challenges with recommendations (cont'd)

Measurement Areas	Findings: Challenges, Needs and Opportunities	Recommendation
Technical Capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Limited understanding of codes and guidelines by local infrastructure organizations / contractors</li> <li>Insufficient practical training</li> <li>No standardized accreditation and licensure</li> <li>Language barriers between local infrastructure firms and contractors and USAID representatives and implementing partners</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Accredit schools and standardize quality measures and curricula.</li> <li>Reinforce/build the capacity of the professional associations.</li> <li>Sub-contracting to local organizations; focus on capacity building.</li> <li>Create opportunities for internships.</li> </ul>
Operational Capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Local infrastructure firms' lack of training in business</li> <li>Insufficient systems and capacity to bid on and manage projects</li> <li>Difficulty securing finances</li> <li>Nepotism in HR practices</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reinforce/build the capacity of the professional associations.</li> <li>Sub-contracting to local organizations; focus on capacity building.</li> <li>Training in organizational management and bidding.</li> <li>Create opportunities for internships.</li> </ul>
Sector Performance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unrealistic bids affecting quality</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Vet organizations before bidding, ensure bids are realistic</li> </ul>


## Additional opportunities for USAID's strengthened influence

- Increase collaboration at initial project design stages: Greater involvement of Haitian counterparts and constituent local communities
- Broader language competencies in French & Creole within USAID
- Coordination within USAID/Haiti across different offices and sectors
- Improve transitions across staffing changes for continuity (onboarding)





Thank you!





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